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Detente has created dissension within NATO, dissension
centered on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The FRG's
contribution to detente - Ostpolitik - has made it both a
focus of controversy within the Alliance and a prime target
of Soviet pressure. Since Germany is vital to a stable
European order, the German question has had high priority
on the detente agenda. This thesis analyzes the unresolved
German question, and the resulting West German security
dilemma, in terms of the conflict and incompatibility between
American, Soviet and West German designs for a future
European security order. It suggests that inconsistent and
vacillating American detente policies have helped to
encourage the FRG to seek its own divergent accommodation
with the USSR. The FRG's Ostpolitik will probably
continue to be vulnerable to Soviet manipulation. Further
discord in the US-West German alliance is therefore likely.
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A word for all seasons, detente has come to symbolize
the mode, and mood, of East-West relations since the late
1960's. Originally restricted to the sphere of US-Soviet
global strategic issues, this term has def init ionally
evolved over time from a rather limited application to a
convenient and comforting pallative for public consumption.
Specifically, a tactic designed for the conduct of
international relations has been generally equated with
the goal itself of those relations. Additionally, the
content of the expression has varied situat ionally , with
national inflections characterizing the demands placed upon
detente. These factors of time, political inclination,
degree of political awareness and nationality have all
contributed to the present situation of "detente con-
frontation" within the West. The implications of this
controversy for NATO are significant in that they create
opportunities for Soviet exploitation to further weaken
cohesion within the Alliance.
In its three and a half decades of existence, the
Altantic Alliance has been in a state of crisis with
remarkable regularity. From forward defense, through the
rearming and entry of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
into the Alliance, to flexible response and modernization,
this disparate collection of countries has nonetheless-
exhibited the ability to eventually agree upon a unified
response to the common threat of possible Soviet military
•agression in Western Europe. The latest crisis to affect
NATO, however, is of a different nature than the previous
ones that produced a unified closing of the ranks.
The detente policy adopted as the preferred framework
for the conduct of relations with the East has been the
source of many a recent intra-Alliance disagreement. Thus
the irony that , although detente represents an attempt to
reduce tension with the foe, internal dissent over pursuit
of the policy has strained relations among the friends.
Criticism has even extended to the point of asserting that
US detente actually blurred the lines of distinction
between allies and enemies [Ref. 1: pp. 20-23]. Thus a
self-chosen political modus vivendi has adversely affected
Alliance cohesion to a degree never yet achieved by an
external military threat. This conflict of opinion within
the Western camp on the issue of detente with the Soviet
Union has been most clearly, and perhaps shockingly,
manifested in US relations with its erstwhile "model ally",
the FRG.
Germany has proven historically to be the crucial
factor in the establishment of a stable European security
system. Since "both world wars and the Cold War broke out
over the issue of what Germany's role in the international
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system should be" [Ref. 2: p. 102], the division of that
country reflects to a significant extent the determination
of the victorious Allied Powers of World War II to preclude
the future development of a potentially disruptive power in
Central Europe. At the same time, however, and all
stability-inspired intentions to the contrary, discord
between the USSR and the three Western powers responsible
for the ultimate settlement of the German question has ensured
the continued existence of a legitimate national grievance
in the heart of Europe.
Due to their vital geostrategic location, both the FRG
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have of necessity
served as the military fulcrum for, respectively, NATO
and Warsaw Pact operational planning. Until recently, the
complete dependence of the FRG on NATO for the provision
of its security needs had sufficed to ensure at least
minimal commonality with Alliance, i.e. American-sponsored,
policies. The present lack of detente consensus with Bonn
is quite understandably of special concern to Washington.
In spite of Adenauer's successful efforts to solidly and
unambiguously unite West Germany's fate with that of the
West, the recently demonstrated determination to pursue a
more regionally-based independent foreign policy vis-a-vis
the USSR has predictably raised spectres of either another
Rapallo or a united but neutral Germany. Given the
enormity of the stakes involved, and Joffe's contention
that Germany has only turned to the East when either
humiliated or deserted by the West, [Ref. 3: p. 721] that
country could conceivably once again become the focus of
embittered US-Soviet relations.
Largely responsible for the collapse of Allied consensus
after Potsdam, Germany became the quintessential expression
of East-West confrontation. The rivalry of two antagonistic
social systems was initially staged almost exclusively on the
German scene. It was, and remains, the only terrain where
massive US and Soviet armed forces directly confront each
other. The world's attention was more than once riveted
on West Berlin, the most vulnerable point of Western
defense. Isolated 110 miles inside the GDR, the Soviets
repeatedly subjected the city to harassment and several
spectacular displays of pressure politics in efforts to
force Allied withdrawal.
A focus of acute East-West competition, Germany
represented the great economic and political prize, the
partial control of which neither the US nor the USSR has
been willing to relinquish for a reunification of
unpredictable consequences. Thus, with the advent of
detente as an announced "era of negotiations", one could
logically have expected Berlin and the German question to
have been high priorities on the superpower agenda. But
did a successful resolution of these German issues weigh
equally in Washington-Moscow deliberations to establish
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a climate of relaxed tension? How did each define success
and what, if attained, did it represent for the conceptualized
view of the probable future structure of a European security
system? Or, to use Hassner's phrasing, "the real question
is: what kind of Germany can be fitted in what kind of
Europe and what kind of world?" [Ref. 4: p. 7] Amid all the
confusion of definition and controversy of interpretation
surrounding US-Soviet detente, an extra dimension was added
to the attempts by the superpowers to answer Hassner's
question: implementation of the FRG ' s own detente policy
with the East ( Ostpolitik )
.
During the first two decades of its existence, the FRG
had contented itself with reliance on US determination of
NATO's Eastern policy. Yet for years "many voices in both
Washington and London seem[ed] to favor a more active role
for the Federal Republic. They wish[ed] to avoid constant
criticisms and to induce the Federal Republic to assume
greater responsibility for its future". [Ref. 5: p. 212]
Couched within that recommendation was the admonishment to
accept political realities and adopt a more reasonable
negotiating stance vis-a-vis the East. In 1969 Bonn
accordingly overcame its previous reluctance to pursue
detente by initiating a full-fledged program of
normalization with the East.
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As a prerequisite for its new Eastern policies, the FRG
had had to engage in its own "agonizing reappraisal" of
operant political assumptions. In effect the superpower
detente impetus had seemingly greatly altered Bonn's existing
international framework of reference. Specifically, no
longer able to depend on Alliance support for its revisionist
claims, the FRG faced on acute dilemma: how to continue
pursuing the goal of German unity with the leading power in
the Western alliance declaring the status quo the highest
maxim? [Ref. 6: .p. 113] What modified conceptual factors
were therefore necessary to accommodate the development of
an Qstpolit ik in consonance with overall NATO interests?
How did the formulation devised take into account national
goals, i.e. what has been the FRG ' s response to that
structural question of "what kind of Germany in what kind
of Europe"? And yet more importantly, what effect has
Ostpolitik had on West German relations with Washington and
Moscow?
This thesis attempts to answer the above questions by
investigating the impact of detente on the German question.
In order to better appreciate the interplay of forces
responsible for events, background considerations of a
politico-cultural nature, general detente concepts and
detente expectations specifically concerning the German
question will be presented for the US, USSR and FRG. The
political results for the FRG of a West German Ostpolitik
conducted within the context of an overarching US-Soviet
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detente will then be discussed. The concluding chapter will
detail the unanticipated and, potentially, unwanted
consequences for NATO of detente policy regarding the
European security order. It sets out alternative futures
for Europe in terms of American tutelege. West German
ascendency or Soviet hegemony.
Because of West Germany's importance to NATO and previous
Alliance, and especially US, preoccupations about its
foreign policy activity, the focus throughout is oriented
more toward the FRG than either of the superpowers. Given
US-European disagreement on Soviet policy and the fact that
Bonn has been the object of great pressure from both Moscow
and Washington due to Ostpolitik , a greater awareness of
the goals motivating and constraints operating on the FRG
is essential to limit detente damage within NATO. In
treating the behavior of the three governments, the emphasis
is on contrasting the significance ascribed to the German
question in terms of international structure and national
security interests, and on the ultimate aims of each
government. These aims have been grounded in the underlying
assumptions of divergent political cultures that created
varying, and even antithetical, Welt anschauungen . In the
final analysis, incompatible images of the international
order and of national roles within it combined with
asymmetrical regional interests to impart a vastly differing




' The international system that developed immediately
after World War II differed tremendously from that which had
previously structured world affairs. Two victorious Allied
Powers, the US and the USSR, emerged as undisputed leaders
of antagonistic groupings of states. Although experiencing
a time lag in some respects, the dilemmas facing the US were
essentially similar to those encountered by the USSR and
have therefore characterized post-war relations for both
countries. The scope and nature of responsibility required
of the US as champion of Western values in opposition to
those of the communist East created challenges unprecedented
in American history.
The first novel aspect of this era has been the necessity
of dealing with an adversary on a permanent basis, i.e., a
long-term competition with no end in sight. Possession
of credible military deterrents, especially in the form of
nuclear arsenals capable of destroying most of mankind, has
precluded employment of the traditional method of conflict
resolution, i.e., war. A second new element involved the
extent of commitment required. The US was called out of its
traditional isolation to guard against a perceived communist
threat on a global scale. London's announcement in 1947
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that it was no longer able to guarantee the territorial
integrity of Greece and Turkey signaled the de facto
collapse of pax Britannica well in advance of the official
withdrawal from East of Suez inherent within the 1966
decision to build no new carriers and phase out of
service those in existence in the early 1970s. [Ref. 7: p. 4]
The US thus had to assume that maritime duty. Finally, a
third factor concerned the protection of allies, this too on
a permanent and global basis. This consideration of having
to conduct adversary relations within the constrictive
framework of allied needs and desires tremendously
complicated an already daunting task. Given the above
constraints on policy formulation, the US developed and
implemented the strategy of containment in an effort to
curtail the growth of Soviet influence.
In its most basic and pure form, containment sought to
guarantee militarily national sovereignty and provide
economic assistance to countries threatened by communist
aggression. Support of nationalist forces was deemed the
surest form of defense against communist intervention. The
US accordingly had to identify the geographic areas vital to
its own strategic interest and invest resources as needed
to construct a point defense around the USSR. It was not
an original intention to "reform" or influence the internal
affairs of any state. Variety of governmental form per se
was not something inherently inimical to the world order
15
that the US was seeking to establish. "The United States
could coexist with, even benefit from, diversity; what was
dangerous was the combination of hostility with the
ability to do something about it." [Ref. 8: p. 31]
The belief in goodwill and "friendly persuasion" to
modify Soviet behavior had been dashed on the realities of
Eastern Europe. Containment attempted to grapple with the
problem from a more realistic foundation:
In essence, the official view of Soviet behavior and how
to deal with it consisted of several logically related
propositions which fused the newly discovered ideological
insights with traditional realpolit ik ;
1. For historic, ideological, and intended political
reasons, the Soviet Union seeks to "fill every nook and
cranny in the world basin of power" (in Kennan's words).
2. Soviet leaders exercise the expansionist propensity
persistently, opportunistically, realistically, and
cautiously, with particular concern to avoid using their
armed forces except to maintain control over countries
behind the Iron Curtain.
3. The essential and feasible objectives of the United
States, therefore, is to contain Soviet expansion by
building "situations of strength" (as Acheson put it)
and being prepared to exert countervailing pressure by
force and other means at constantly shifting geographical
and political points.
4. Successful containment, in the long run, will lead
to the moderation of Soviet behavior, Soviet willingness
to negotiate settlements of conflicting interests, or
possibly the collapse of the Soviet system and its East
European empire. [Ref. 9: pp. 5-6]
A dual function was performed by economics as both informer
of many of the underlying political assumptions responsible
for detente policies and instrument of implementation for
the same.
16
First and foremost a commercial country, the US, as the
world's leading market economy, had the largest stake in
maintaining global stability. Profitable trade being
absolutely dependent upon sure markets and uninterrupted
access to raw materials, it was essential to institute a
pax Americana to fill the void left by the British. This
form of national existence dictated US preoccupation with
peace, defined as lack of conflict, and political stability,
defined as the status quo . The impact of this commercialism
was reflected, however, not only in life style but also in
societal values. A product of the Enlightenment, American
culture absorbed much more of that intellectual movement
than merely classical economic theory.
The quest for peace as a function of sustaining the
status quo could most effectively be pursued by a realpolit ik
of the classical European model. The associated concept of
balance pervaded early American political thought and
expressed itself most notably in the system of "checks and
balances" characterizing the country's governmental
structure. The inherent element of calculation struck a
responsive chord in a country of pragmatism. Certain that
rationality reigned in both the universe and the human mind,
a sense of control over one's destiny embued American culture
with the confident belief in the ability to find an ever
"better" way.
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Application of the practical and maintenance of the
successful, while simultaneously searching for improvement,
optimistically defined a progress both attainable and
eternal. The unremitting requirements of the continously new
and demonstrably efficacious fostered traits of impatience,
a demand for immediacy and a low tolerance for the
permanent. The operant philosophical framework was therefore
one of generalities, all of which were subject to
modification or rejection.
Applied to foreign relations management, the American
belief in the primacy of common sense was amenable to a
policy of compromise and negotiations as a means to regulate
conflicts of interests. This approach was also a mechanistic
view of problem-solving, one which suited the American
temperament and allowed for an expected rational and
reasonable solution of differences. Cooperation, mutual
benefits, quid pro quo
,
confidence building measures and
goodwill were associated concepts of vital significance.
Yet all force of compelling logic to the contrary, the US
has refused to wholeheartedly embrace a strategy of
realpolit ik . As Pipes has noted, "it is probably true to
say that no country has ever exceeded the United States in
its loyalty to that principle which on the conscious level
it finds itself unable to accept." [Ref. 10: p. 12] Since
attitudes and conceptions responsible for pragmatic policy
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decisions often ran counter to other more ethically-oriented
convictions, balance-of-power considerations frequently
collided with a belief in the efficacy of economics itself
as a "civilizing agent".
Marked by an unmistakable strain of moralism, America
has always reserved a sense of aversion to the "dirty"
politics of Europe. Harboring a conviction of the innate
superiority of its own institutions, those being the end
product of that search for the "better way", it seemed but
natural to export that success. In the course of time,
liberal government and domestic well-being had become
inextricably linked in the collective mind. Growth,
progress and even degree of civilization had come to be
measured by the yardstick of standard of living enjoyed by
the general public. The crucial prerequisite for economic
health was, of course, political stability. These deeply
ingrained assumptions resulted in the willingness to
finance the Marshall Plan and informed the expectation
that improvement of living conditions would foster a
commensurate liberalization of the political order. Often
contradicting official disclaimers of eschewing inter-
national interference and ignoring de Tocqueville '
s
well-documented observation "that existing orders are most
threatened when conditions improve, rather than the other
way around", [Ref. 8: p. 278] these views not infrequently
led to incoherent policy decisions.
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Although the unacknowledged power politics considerations
generated an uncomfortable malaise, the belief nonetheless
persisted that the greater the sway of Western, i.e.,
American, values and their stabilizing influence, the less
opportunity available for the destabilizing presence of
communism. These fundamental elements formed the
ideological building blocks from which containment strategy
was constructed. Whether one agrees with Gaddis' assertion
that the Nixon-Kissinger detente was primarily the old
containment in a new guise [Ref. 11: p. 359] or with
Hoffmann's contention that such an evaluation was too
superficial and misleading [Ref. 12: p. 236], what emerged
clearly gave the impression of a new US stance vis-a-vis
the USSR. And like its policy predecessor, detente theory
held the attraction of combining the novel with the
idealistic, thereby giving evidence of Schlesinger '
s
observation that "no paradox is more persistent than the
historic tension in the American soul between an addiction
to experiment and a susceptibility to ideology."
[Ref. 13: p. 1]
B. GENERAL THEORY AND GOALS
If it is true that the most powerful thing in the world
is an idea whose time has come, 1969 was the propitious
moment for American detente initiatives. Fundamental
international and domestic changes had occurred in the
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decade of the 1960s that could no longer be managed within
the operant conceptual framework. A thorough re-evaluation
of the inherited containment theory was undertaken and,
as had been the case with every administration since the
Truman years, was appropriately modified to correct the
mistakes of the immediate predecessors. The "era of
negotiations" announced by Nixon represented a new mix of a
few basic recurring themes that had previously been combined
in differing proportions according to varying lists of
priorities, thereby marking changing US perceptions of the
preferred containment methodology and its own capabilities
to manage the Soviet threat.
In its essential points, the world of 1969 was very
different from the one of the Truman Doctrine.
1. New centers of power had developed in Western Europe
and Japan that had created the prerequisites for a
relationship to the US founded on partnership.
2. New nations had been formed in other parts of the
world and had developed sufficient self-confidence
to accept a larger share in the provision of their
security and economic development needs.
3. The monolithic communist bloc of the Stalin period
had become a loosely coherent grouping of states, over
and above which a deep split had been opened between
China and the Soviet Union.
4. In the last three decades the Soviet Union had risen
from a position of military inferiority to parity
with the US and even superiority as regards several
important weapons systems.
5. The bipolar world of the 1940s and 1950s had given
way to, within restrictions, a multipolar one.
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6. New problems were transcending the geographical and
ideological borders of the past to create an increasing
interdependence of nations.
Above all, however, the Nixon Doctrine reflected the
conception that the strategic-technological-economic
dominance of the US was ended. [Ref. 14: p. 628]
Although much was said about mult ipolarity and partnership,
especially the increased allied/client role in assuming
responsibility for assisting in maintenance of international
stability, the most salient issues for the US concerned
Soviet military capabilities and Soviet expansionist
activities. Thus, from Washington's security perspective,
the world remained very much a bipolar one and policy
revisions adjusting to the new balance of power obtaining
in that area had to be quickly formulated.
The Vietnam imbroglio had created domestic political
consensual and credibility crises that demanded speedy
resolution. Budgetary considerations imposed by the war
likewise necessitated are-evaluation of the global
"policeman" role that the procurement of relatively
cost-effective nuclear weapons funded by Keynesian
economics had once seemed able to support. It was
primarily prosaic constraints of this sort rather than
a purely theoretical doctrinal desire to consciously
limit the scope of national interests that precipitated
outlining a strategy based on de-emphasizing previously
employed instruments of policy while incorporating other
means of control. The shift to a stress on negotiations
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and on expansion of trade and cultural exchanges was
designed to compensate for the decreased military role
forced on the government by the disillusionment associated
with the Vietnam conflict. To cover this retrenchment,
innovative official justifications for the reliance on
treaties as a suitable substitute for military power and
presence were not lacking.
The main task of the Nixon-Kissinger detente was to
formulate a coherent foreign policy that would take into
account the altered international power ratio while
adequately safeguarding America's strategic interests.
"At a high level of abstraction, the United States has
sought three broad goals in its relationship with the
Soviet Union: avoiding nuclear war; containing the spread
of Soviet power and ideology; and gradually encouraging
change in the nature and behavior of the Soviet Union."
[Ref. 15: p. 325] Successful in the first goal, the
second and third were sought via the tactic of linking
treaties in the area of security affairs with agreements
of an economic and technological nature.
Given the inescapable logic of deterrence theory and
mutual assured destruction capabilities, it was assumed
that modern states had no sane alternative to cooperation.
"American leaders tend to view international relations in
a highly optimistic and volunt arist ic fashion. It is
often assumed that cooperation and harmony-rather than
conflict and hostility-are the natural state of
international politics and that once unnecessary
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impediments to friendship among nations are removed (like
misunderstanding, miscommunicat ion , or political leaders
who are insufficiently responsive to the yearnings of
their people), peace will reign." [Ref. 16: p. 306]
The USSR was to be slowly drawn into the existing world
order and would therefore cease for reasons of self-interest
to pursue its destabilizing interventionist policies.
Reliance on the commercial factor as an effective "carrot"
in this strategy reflected a valid asymmetrical approach to
containment as well as a more dubious expectation that, once
the Soviet economy had been penetrated, "consequent
embourgeoisement of foreign policy" [Ref. 1: p. 23] would
follow ipso facto . The entire process envisioned
maneuvering the USSR into a position of self-imposed
self-restraint.
Even though it was not anticipated that the ideological
character itself would be transformed, Soviet revolutionary
activity was expected to be curbed by pragmatic status quo
considerations. Hoffman has pointedly summarized the
purpose of detente, on a less high level of abstraction, as
"the major part of an ambitious world policy that tried to
force the Soviet Union, through a network of linked rewards
and punishments, to play the role assigned to it by America's
leaders in a 'stable structure of peace' that would have
preserved America's primacy and ensured the triumph of its
very conservative notion of stability." [Ref. 12: p. 231]
Beneath all this hopeful theorizing about social sceintific
methods of behavior modification lay the uncomfortable fact
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that it was simply not feasible to continue dealing with
the USSR from the customary "positions of strength".
As mentioned earlier, nuclear superiority was no longer
an advantage enjoyed by the US. Since any viable foreign
policy had to take into account that primary structural
reality, acceptance of the USSR as a member into the world
economic system had to be correspondingly accompanied by
recognition of its claim to military equality. By granting
this point of prestige and at the same time implying the
satisfaction of imputed motivational security needs, it was
thought that the drive to overtake a rival leader would be
blunted. Since "the arms race has no winners," attainment
of parity would create the proper psychological basis
conducive to mutually beneficial strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT). Also, as noted by Aspaturian, "the idea was
that if the United States voluntarily accepted the Soviet
Union as an equal strategic power, the Soviet Union would
reciprocate by accepting military parity as a terminal
goal and refrain from interventionist behavior in the Third
World." [Ref. 9: p. 23]
By the ploy of channeling Soviet ambitions constructively
into "the system", the US planned to control them to its own
advantage and thereby procure a greater degree of global
stability. At the heart of this line of reasoning about
parity was "America's faith in the efficacy of the
balance-of-power principle. . . . The hope behind this
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gamble seems to be that once a nuclear equilibrium between
the two powers has been obtained, a dynamic and therefore
potentially explosive situation will defuse and turn
static." [Ref. 10: p. 13] All of these threads of thought,
status quo
,
multipolarity , strategic balance, national
interest and stability, converged for the US in the
geopolitical area of single most vital concern outside its
own territory: Europe. Viewed in the most conservative
terms possible, what held for the continent did doubly so
for Germany.
C. THE GERMAN QUESTION
In his State of the World address of February 18, 1970,
Nixon "distinguished NATO from all other commitments since
'Europe must be the cornerstone of the structure for a
durable peace.'" [Ref. 17: p. 151] Unlike the fluid and
often ambiguous situation in the Third World, a long
acknowledged and clearly discernible division into spheres
of influence has dictated superpower relations in the
European setting. In both its ideological crusade to
counter communism and its undeviating determination to
define stability in terms of the status quo , America's
Soviet policy has focused on protecting its European
allies. Although legally obligated to work toward German
unity on the basis of self-determinat ion , the issue had in
reality been relegated to rhetoric well before Nixon took
office.
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Scene of unremitting Cold War tension and undisputedly
the most aggrieved party in the postwar "settlement", the
resolution of Germany's unsettled political fate was
originally considered the key to a lasting European peace
arrangement. The source of instability was perceived in
terms of conflicting political wills. Washington and
Moscow being equally aware of the crucial geostrategic
significance of Germany and therefore unwilling to sacrifice
control over "its" part for the sake of questionable
reunification. schemes with unpreditable consequences,
maneuverability toward a political solution of the problem
was non-existent. The resultant stalemate, however, came
to be an enduring concern only for the FRG.
Western enthusiasm for the task of creating a viable
political alternative waned perceptibly over the years with
the failure of a Soviet invasion to materialize. Although
publicly supportive of Bonn's interests, many within the
Alliance remembered that NATO functioned as a means to
integrate and thereby control a potentially dangerous
resurgent Germany as well as a collective defense against
possible Soviet aggression. A strong, unified Germany had
not been realistically considered compatible with their
national interests by most European states, including the
USSR. [Ref. 2: p. 105], Thus, "in a system where two
German states exist, the twin goals of guaranteeing their
security and of restricting their freedom of action, of
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preventing them from being friendly to the point of
reunification and hostile to the point of war, is [sic]
achieved most satisfactorily by the presence of Soviet
and American troops." [Ref. 18: p. 23] Slowly the
attitude of shared responsibility for fulfillment of the
de jure Alliance contractual goal of German reunification
gave way to a tacit acceptance of and preference for the
status quo .
In 1955 Eisenhower had asserted that "while that division
[of Germany] continues, it creates a basic source of
instability in Europe. Our talk of peace has little meaning
if at the same time we perpetuate conditions endangering the
peace." [Ref. 19: p. 12] After erection of the Berlin Wall
in August 1961, Kennedy could flatly state that "Germany
has been divided for sixteen years and will continue to
stay divided. The Soviet Union is running an unnecessary
risk in trying to change this from an accepted fact into a
legal state." (Emphasis added) [Ref. 20: p. 399] Having
established its dominant role within the Alliance, and
hence in European affairs, as well as successfully limiting
Soviet territorial gains to those claimed as spoils of war,
the US was reluctant to tamper with an obviously stable
situation. In this regard Washington was in full agreement
with Adenauer's early slogan of "no experiments".
This reversal of opinion on the source of a threat of
European peace was clearly evident already in 1959 when
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"the West, in consenting to discuss Berlin's status
separately granted implicitly that instability derived from
circumstances other than the lack of a general German
settlement." [Ref. 19: p. 28} After the Cuban crisis of
1962 Americans became preoccupied with strategic arms
issues and means of avoiding superpower "miscalculations."
In many Western minds the political arrangement in Europe
had become reliably dependable and therefore permanently
acceptable, even if not morally respectable. Kennedy spoke
for many when he remarked in 1963 that "Berlin is secure,
the Europe as a whole is well protected. What really
matters at this point is the rest of the world." [Ref. 19:
p. 44] The somewhat surprising aspect to all this was the
persistently and therefore unavoidably hypocritical
adherence at the public level to the old, official
rationale. As late as 1967 in the NATO Harmel Report the
15 allies asserted that
no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible
without a solution to the German question which lies at
the heart of the present tensions in Europe. Any such
settlement must end the unnatural barriers between
Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and
cruelly manifested in the division of Germany. [Ref. 21:
pp. 87-88]
The attitude of a sealed fate and the need to move on to
more important global matters became accepted US doctrine
and was faithfully continued by Nixon and Kissinger.
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"In 1969, impatience with the rigors of the Cold War
was pervasive in the West. All leaders were under pressure
to demonstrate their commitment to peace; . . . Western
governments had been maneuvered into the position of feeling
obligated to prove their goodwill in East-West relations."
[Ref. 22: p. 403] To prevent becoming isolated within the
Alliance, the FRG felt constrained to begin normalizing
relations with the East. Having exchanged reunification for
a de facto acceptance of the territorial status quo as the
precondition to these negotiations, Bonn dutifully complied
with NATO, and especially US, detente urgings. To preserve
Alliance unity Kissinger considered it essential to pursue
an indivisible detente in Europe by "establishing clear
criteria to determine its course. . . . The Soviets must
entertain no hope of dividing the Alliance by selective
detente with some allies but not with others." [Ref. 22:
p. 403] This concern was especially acute with regard to
the execution of West German Eastern policies.
Fearful that an increased nationalist sentiment could
be sparked, Kissinger was determined to control the flow of
events and coordinate developments according to his own
schedule. As seen from the Soviet viewpoint, "an
accommodation directly between Bonn and Moscow would carry
with it the additional dividend of excluding the United
States from the solution of a major European problem,
setting a precedent that might cause other Europeans to
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look increasingly to Moscow rather than Washington." [Ref. 22:
p. 259] To preclude realization of that danger, linkage was
employed as a tactic whereby West German ratification of the
proposed Moscow Treaty and the convening of a European
Security Conference were made contingent upon the conclusion
of a satisfactory agreement on Berlin. In that fashion the
US "harnessed the beast of detente" [Ref. 22: p. 534] and
safely ensured the continuation of the status quo . By
confining itself to the single issue of Berlin, the only
point of direct responsibility vis-a-vis the USSR, the US
demonstrated that it "was primarily interested in stabilizing
the global balance through arms control and conflict muting
rules of superpower politics; Washington was thus less
interested in structural change a la CSCE or regional
arms-control measures a la MBFR." [Ref. 23: p. 237]
US participation in the opening phases of CSCE and MBFR
was much more the result of falling a victim to its own
linkage strategem than a refelction of genuine desire.
Although CSCE held a humanitarian appeal and MBFR proved a
means to counter Congressional pressure for unilateral troop
reductions as well as to offer the prospect of equal
security at less cost, little political value for
contributing to the establishment of the new East-West




In large measure the primary US motivation was to
appease West European sensitivities on those issues. Thus
an appearance of consensus was presented to the East and
Washington was in a position to monitor events and, if
necessary, exert a directing influence (e.g. US refusal to
support the West German attempt to use MBFR "to link the
United States to the problem of negotiating the military
aspects of European security in an East-West setting."
[Ref. 24: p. 405]) Soviet refusal to negotiate on terms
acceptable to the West produced stalemated MBFR talks.
Well before the CSCE Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975,
the bloom had left the detente rose for Washington. The
US was simply much more preoccupied "with the rest of the
world" (above all, Vietnam, but also its bilateral
relationship with the USSR and the opening to China) to
devote great attention to European affairs. Its insistence
on an indivisible detente, however, additionally represented
an attempt to restore stability within the Alliance itself.
Ironically, Kissinger claimed that Washington itself had
"risked being isolated within the Alliance and pushing
Europe toward neutralism" [Ref. 22: p. 403] if it had proven
reluctant to pursue detente. Although the relative positions
of leadership within the Alliance, distribution of military
strength and degree of political leverage available still
favored the US, a worry about isolation indicated an
undeniable weakening of American authority. In spite of
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statements about mult ipolarity and partnership, of pleas for
European political unity and the acceptance of greater
military "burden-sharing", the US was in reality reluctant
to relinquish, or significantly share, its leadership role.
An indivisible detente was a tactic that
favors American control over the direction of developments
with global consequences. It is the continuing commitment
to hierarchy and centralized control
,
the assumption that
only through hierarchy and centralization can stability
be assured. ... A conception of indivisible detente
based on hierarchical and centralized control amounts to
a major revision in the organization of the stereotyped
world order, not its demise. Kissinger is an adaptive
conservative, not a radical. His policy of detente is an
attempt to maintain the central management of the two
alliance systems in an international environment that has
experienced a major change since 1970. [Ref. 25: p. 8]
Linkage and indivisible detente succeeded in obtaining the
US goal of reaching an agreement on Berlin, but they did
not survive the withdrawal of active American participation
from the continuing European detente initiatives. Having
protected their limited regional interest, Kissinger and
Nixon were content to leave the remaining details and
growing momemtum of regional detente to the Europeans.




The immediate post-war period left the USSR at a relative
military and economic disadvantage vis-^-vis the US while
simultaneously presenting it with analogous political
challenges. Ideologically prepared to deal with an
adversary on a permanent basis, and indeed requiring a
lasting foe, Moscow was actually in a somewhat better
position than Washington for coping with that situation.
Likewise the issue of alliance leadership was more directly
solved by the simple expedient of installing puppet govern-
ments supported by Soviet occupational forces. Yet because
of their weakened condition of economic exhaustion and
severe manpower depletion, as well as still developing a
nuclear capability, the Soviets could not lightly dismiss
Western reaction to their oppressive actions in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Determined not to allow free elections in those
territories, Stalin relied upon a combination of bellicose
threats and forces operant within the West itself to
protect the Red Army from attack by its recent allies.
Exaggerated estimates of Soviet capabilities and the
vision of "red hordes" being unleashed in Central Europe
should Stalin be unduly provoked proved sufficiently
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self-deterring to preclude further military action for the
sake of occupied territories. Although distrustful of
Soviet intentions, war-weary Western governments were
obligated to heed the public demand for immediate
demobilization, thereby removing the means with which to
dislodge Soviet forces. Granted that reprieve, Moscow
exploited the opportunity presented to firmly establish its
presence in Central and Eastern Europe, rebuild its economic
base and expand its military capabilities, to include develop-
ment of a nuclear force. Thus, while the US was devising
and implementing its containment strategy, the USSR was
concentrating on consolidating control over its hard-won
territorial gains and redressing the superpower military
imbalance. Peaceful coexistence was the tactic selected
to provide the breathing space necessary to achieve those
goals.
Unlike their American counterparts, Soviet policy-makers
have never confused detente with entente nor equated a
relaxation of tension with either a reduction in the means
to pursue conflict or a resolution of the causes of that
conflict
.
Soviet authorities have gone "to great lengths to explain
that peaceful coexistence is not a formula for preserving
the status quo , for achieving a balance between East and
West or a power parity between the US and the USSR, for
"bridge-building", for interrupting or alleviating conflict
and struggle, or for anything of the sort. The Soviet
authorities have endlessly stressed that peaceful
coexistence is, rather, a formula for action under
contemporary conditions. [Ref. 26: p. 6]
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As a method for conducting foreign relations, the concept
dated to, and hence derived its legitimacy from, Lenin's
approval of "peaceful cohabitation" with capitalist countries
It was always made clear, however, that the measure was a
mere expedient to allow time for consolidation of the Party
and strengthening of the Soviet state vis-a-vis the
"imperialist enemy". "The Leninist concept was explicitly
intended as a maneuver to cope with a particular situation
at a particular time. ... As a tactic, Lenin considered
the Soviet peace policy as subject to instant change."
[Ref. 26: pp. 15, 21] Analogous to Stalin's situation
after World War II, Lenin's after World War I demanded a
peace policy to ease Western suspicions of Soviet intentions
and thereby permit national recovery. In both instances
that limited goal was achieved. Unlike Lenin, however,
Stalin placed far greater requirements on peaceful
coexistence than those of merely domestic concern. A
previously defensive tactic was employed offensively to
achieve foreign policy goals.
The Czech coup had precipitated the common Western
European military response to a perceived Soviet threat
that culminated in the' 1949 formation of NATO. The Berlin
crisis of 1948 and the Korean War of 1950 had forged a
unity of will very much not in Soviet interests. A prime
goal of the USSR, however, was to foster disunity in the
West for the eventual purpose of removing the US presence.
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An even more pressing security requirement was the prevention
of West German rearmament. Whenever threats proved ineffec-
tive, or actually counterproductive by reinforcing the
Western image of an aggressive Soviet regime, Stalin began
to switch tactics abruptly and plead a desire for peaceful
coexistence. The apparent lack of coherence in this
strategy helped to confuse Western governments about true
Soviet aims, thereby beginning to erode the consensus
concerning the very nature of the threat itself. Further-
more, "if Stalin was correct that the foreseeable future
would more likely witness tension among capitalist countries
rather than discord between East and West , then it was
logical to cultivate relations with each Western capitalist
nation separately." [Ref. 27: p. 96] Any weakening of the
ties between Alliance members was to be encouraged via
bilateral agreements in order to inhibit the impetus toward
Western unity. The political benefit gained thereby was
supplemented, however, by a military payoff.
Peaceful coexistence was expected to provide the screen
that would permit military modernization and buildup.
Nuclear weapons procurement was an important and steadily
pursued goal, although first priority was not assigned to
nor a strategic employment doctrine formulated for such
systems until the post-Stalin years. Under the cover of
the peace program conventional forces were substantially
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expanded to. counter opposing NATO troops. Very much
aware of the political significance of military power,
Relaxation of tension suited this military purpose,
especially if it "softened up" NATO by doing what
Malenkov had indicated so significantly in his August
1953 inaugural address: If today, under conditions of
tension in relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent
by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening
of this tension may lead to its disintegration.
[Ref. 27: p. 97]
An even earlier and more explicit statement on the
correlation between peace initiatives and military
modernization, and the ultimate purpose of both, was
provided by Manuiliski in 1931:
Until the attainment of complete military superiority we
will start the most dramatic peace movement that has
ever existed. There will be electrifying proposals and
extraordinary concessions; the capitalist countries,
stupid and decadent, will be working with pleasure at
their own destruction. They will be lured by
opportunities for new friendships. [Ref. 28: p. 202]
A sense of urgency, deriving from conditions other than the
threat posed by NATO, provided further impetus to the
drive for military expansion. An immediate requirement for
large operational forces existed in Central and Eastern
Europe as the result of successful wartime expansion.
The German capitulation of May 8, 1945, left the Red
Army in control of vast stretches of European territory that
had to be rapidly integrated, by force if necessary, into
the socialist camp. A militantly messianic movement, Soviet
communism was committed to capitalism's defeat and wasted no
sentimentality on the question of expansion by conquest.
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Stalin appealed, however, to security interests as a more
acceptable justification for the continued presence of
occupational forces:
One may ask . . . what can be surprising in the fact
that the Soviet Union, in a desire to ensure its security
for the future, tries to ensure that these "countries"
of Eastern and Central Europe should have governments
whose relations to the Soviet Union are loyal? How can
one, without having lost one's reason, characterize these
peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionary
tendencies ... ? [Ref. 26: p. 8]
How indeed? As Pipes has warned, "Nothing can be further
from the truth than the often heard argument that Russia's
expansion is due to its sense of insecurity and need for
buffers. ... As for buffers, it is no secret that
today's buffers have a way of becoming tomorrow's homeland,
which requires new buffers to protect it." [Ref. 19: p. 70]
What initially appears as incomprehensible interpretations
of "peaceful aspirations" and "expansionary" can be better
understood from a consideration of the Russian historical
experience.
It was no historical accident that Marxist-Leninist
communism developed in Russia. Marx and Engels both
identified a characteristic trait that marked the country
as fertile ground for adoption of the new social theory.
Like many other observers, Karl Marx noted that from the
time of Peter the Great Russian foreign policy showed a
general tendency not merely to expansionism, but to
"unlimited" power. He put this even more strongly in a
speech of January 1876, when he spoke of Russia's
lodestar being "the empire of the world". Engels, too,
wrote of her "dreaming about universal supremacy". They
were referring not to any fixed plan, a wholly explicit
intention, but rather to the spirit and character of
the Russian State. [Ref. 29: p. 733]
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The supranational aspect of communism appealed to a sense
of special mission, thereby providing a more appropriate
justification for an imperial drive. Thus "Marxism, the
most internationalist of nineteenth century ideologies, has
merged with Russian nationalism, their synthesis being
Soviet communism, which is internationalist in form and
nationalist in essence". [Ref. 30: p. 3] An ideology,. be
it religiously, economically or philosophically based, can
only flourish, however, in an environment where the
requisite social preconditions have already evolved.
The immense expanse of the Russian heartland was subject
to both harsh climatic conditions and numerous invasions
by conquering foes. The inhabitants were forced to
subsist under conditions that often reduced life to a basic
struggle for mere survival. These circumstances formed a
characteristic view of the world whose accompanying values
have as significantly motivated the behavior of the Kremlin
as the idealism and liberal philosophy of the Founding
Fathers have that of Capitol Hill.
Russian society developed under the triple constraints
of unfavorable geographic conditions, strict Greek Orthodox
religiosity and the rigors of serfdom. Spared the
mitigating influence of the Enlightenment, mankind was viewed
as inherently evil and in need of external controlling
authorities. Secular institutions were expected to provide
the guiding framework within which individual responsibility
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and initiative were almost completely curtailed. The common
man was not only unable to control himself but was even
unable to ascertain how to lead life properly. Hence the
complete intolerance for chaos, i.e. the absence of
concentrated ruling power effectively controlling the
political process.
Decisions, whether at the local village or the highest
national level, were of a corporate, secretive, unanimous
and authoritarian nature. The vast majority of the Russian
populace
had few if any legally recognized rights, were tied to the
soil, and did not own the land they cultivated. They
managed to survive under these conditions not by
entrusting themselves to the protection of laws and
customs, but by exercising extreme cunning and single-
mindedly pursuing their private interests. . . . These
various elements of historical experience blend to create
a very special kind of mentality, which stresses slyness,
self-interest, reliance on force, skill in exploiting
others, and, by inference, contempt for those unable to
fend for themselves. Marxism-Leninism, which in its
theoretical aspects exerts minor influence on Soviet
conduct, through its ideology of "class warfare"
reinforces these existing predispositions. [Ref. 10: p. 72]
The Russian economic experience also reflected the above
traits.
In spite of a remarkable industrial growth during this
century, the economy as a whole has remained largely self-
enclosed. Although self-sufficiency could be viewed in a
positive light, it has nonetheless preserved a fundamentally
agrarian-style system, with all the attitudes and habits
pertaining thereto. Rather than seeking compromises of
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mutual benefit, as a commercial experience would suggest,
those familiar almost entirely with only the production of
goods conceived of gains solely in terms of another's
losses. The concept of exchange was very much framed in
terms of a zero-sum transaction. That zero-sum perception
of individual relations, however, was likewise manifested
at the level of foreign relations and was indelibly
imprinted on the Russian definition of state security.
Constantly threatened by surrounding antagonistic
neighbors, the Russian state centered on Moscow developed
as a nation while simultaneously incorporating those
opposing peoples. Thus a steady expansion via complete
integration within the homeland has marked centuries of
Russian growth. The diplomatic expertise garnered in this
fashion was characterized by the attitude of elitist
superiority derived from administering subject states, not
by one of mutual respect from dealing with equally sovereign
ones.
A country whose governing apparatus has learned how to
deal with foreign peoples from what are essentially
colonial practices is not predisposed to think in terms
of "a stable international community" or of "the
balance of power". Its instincts are to exert the
maximum force and to regard absorption as the only
dependable way' of settling conflicts with other states,
especially those adjoining one's borders . [Ref. 10: p. 9]
The sensed need to control bordering areas in all directions
was reflected in the concept of equal security.
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A feeling of safety could be provided only from a
military capability equal to that of all possible enemies in
combination. The search for absolute security therefore
encompassed both foreign and domestic, real and potential,
challenges. Once again, the element of control was of
crucial significance. A hostile international force beyond
its own control def init ionally posed a threat to the
continued existence of the Soviet state. [Ref. 31: p. 7]
The military sense of vulnerability was compounded by a
historic feeling of social and technological inferiority
vis-a-vis the West.
Russian attitudes toward Europe, and especially Germany,
have always been of a contradictory nature. The desire to
emulate a culture perceived to be superior was reflected
in early efforts to forcibjy "modernize" Russia. Juxtaposed
against that tendency was the ethnocentric drive to pursue
and preserve a uniquely Russian way of life. The mutually
exclusive sets of beliefs embodied within these two schools
of thought, the conflict between "westernizers" and
"Slavophiles", imparted an ambivalent character to
Westpolit ik that has yet to be resolved. This tension
reflected, and reflects, itself in emotive dichotomies of
fear-envy, need-resentment and fascination-rejection.
In foreign policy behavior, the dual track of
cooperation-antagonism gave evidence of this fundamental
and continued sense of psychological insecurity. Not
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surprisingly, security issues were the primary motivating
impetus for Soviet pursuit of detente in the late 1960s.
All the formative influences presented above, both
historical and social, were of decisive importance for
the determination of goals and methods.
B. GENERAL THEORY AND GOALS
With attainment of nuclear parity, the USSR was finally
in a position to claim treatment as an equal from the US
and the proper deference from lesser powers. The official
acknowledgement of superpower status would permit a
legitimate voice in all global affairs. US containment
could at long last be definitely broken, allowing for the
resumption of traditional expansionist activity. Soviet
influence, under the banner of ideological imperatives to
spread the benefit's of socialism, could be increased on a
broad scale with minimal risk. These new global
opportunities combined with more long-standing regional
concerns to launch offensive activity on many fronts.
What made 1969 so decisive for East-West relations was
the change in the relative "correlation of forces"
obtaining at the world level. On the one hand, border
conflicts with China added a note of urgency to Soviet
Westpolit ik . At the same time and in spite of having
proven previously unreceptive to detente overtures
emanating from Moscow, an essentially retreating US was
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forced to treat with an advancing USSR. To capitalize on
the advantage of the moment and provide an official content
for conducting his program, Brezhnev transformed peaceful
coexistence from a short-term tactic, subject to immediate
revocation, to a long-term strategy of "irreversibility".
Since the very raison d'etre of the Soviet system
requires state enemies and revolutionary socialist progress,
the possibility of a lasting peaceful coexistence with
"imperialist" countries had to be carefully defined. It was
therefore emphasized that the overriding necessity of
avoiding a nuclear war did not compromise the ideological
struggle, nor would the latter be held hostage to the
former. As stated in a 1970 Kommunist editorial:
The policy of peaceful coexistence in its Leninist under-
standing signifies neither the preservation of the social
or political status quo , nor the moderation of the
ideological struggle. In fact, it has facilitated and
facilitates the development of the class struggle
against imperialism inside individual countries as well
as on a world scale, and has created a favorable climate
for the affirmative solution of economic and social
problems. [Ref. 26: p. 119]
From this it could be seen that, contrary to some critics
of Soviet ideology, the Kremlin had not altered its long-term
goals but merely adopted short-term means and tactics to
take into account the constraints imposed by nuclear
weaponry
.
The general idea was that the "inevitability" of a
cataclysmic superpower confrontation would be foresworn for
the sake of interaction at a less intense level of
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competition. Economic benefits, financial credits and
technology transfers were avidly pursued, but that in no
way obviated the inevitable demise of the capitalist
system. Although the fruits of the "other" social system
were willingly imported and SALT I was advantageously
concluded, the fundamental motivational forces remained
at odds with those of the US. "Such concepts as, parity
and stability do not play an important role in either
determining the structure of Soviet process or formulating
the Soviet approach to arms control negotiations."
[Ref. 31: p. 41] The basic drive in Soviet policy was to
foster instability, not to preserve the stable interna-
tional order required by Western economies. Concentrating
on two areas, the Third World and Europe, peaceful
coexistence was paradoxically pursued in the former in a
visibly de-stabilizing fashion while assuming the guise
of a status quo initiative in the latter.
Soviet statements had always insisted that peaceful
coexistence was "the antithesis of a commitment to inter-
national stability." [Ref. 32: p. 19] For that reason
"progressive" wars in Third World countries were "just"
and eligible for Soviet support. Increased activity in
those areas of former Western rule was intended to improve
the Soviet image as a bona fide leading force in
international politics and further the cause of socialism.
There was also a denial strategy operant to prevent
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continued Western access to raw materials and markets.
Although increased Soviet activity was anticipated in the
Third World, the West was unprepared for, and unable to
reconcile with its own vision of peaceful coexistence, the
frequently substantial military assistance given.
"Inasmuch as the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence
refers only to the absence of general war between the two
world camps, and specifically between the USSR and the US,
Soviet spokesmen do not regard the employment of violent
means in the 'progressive' revolutionary struggle as
inconsistent with the Soviet definition of peaceful
coexistence." [Ref. 26: p. 76] This apologia served to
justify the more aggressive nature of policies in the
Third World. As dramatic and significant as Angola and
Ethiopia was, Europe was the most important arena of
conflict due to its security implications. Enticing
global forays were a rather pale and secondary concern in
comparison with the regional dictates associated with the
German question.
C. THE GERMAN QUESTION
Of supreme importance for Soviet security interests
was official recognition of the European territorial
status quo . For centuries Russia had been deeply involved
in Central and Eastern European affairs, as well as
traditionally seeking a greater degree of influence in the
47
Balkans. The Allied intervention after World War I and
the nearly fatal events of World War II reinforced Soviet .
distrust of the West and confirmed the dictum that
security was a function of direct control exerted through
integration. From Moscow's viewpoint, the territories
gained by right of conquest had to be firmly, and preferably
legitimately, anchored in the socialist camp. That, in
conjunction with the division of Germany, were the
overriding goals of Soviet European policies in the effort
to prevent another repetition of the World War II scenario.
• Failure of the West to acknowledge Soviet hegemonial
rule tacitly encouraged unrest in those countries. Although
a NATO attack for the sake of "liberation" was highly
improbable, hopes remained alive within those areas that
Western assistance might arrive after local resistance had
developed. Given that more than once "events since World
War II have taught them that even communist countries
cannot be trusted unless they are under direct Soviet
control", [Ref. 33: p. 582] leaders in the Kremlin could
not content themselves with anything less than official
acceptance of the status quo . For that reason the primary
motivation for Soviet "detente" was the desire to gain
Western recognition of the political and territorial
status quo obtaining since 1945. Toward that end an
all-European security conference, whereby public sanctioning
of the permanent Soviet presence could be obtained, had
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long been a major political goal of Moscow. To achieve
that defensive objective, however, Soviet policy had to
offensively negotiate with the West on the point of central
concern for both sides: Germany. And of all the allied
countries involved, the one whose cooperation and approval
was essential to the overall success of the initiative was
the FRG itself. For the Soviets, the German issue was
inextricably intertwined with the larger European one.
"The focus of Soviet policy toward Western Europe was
and remains Germany. The main preoccupation since 1945
has been to contain West Germany and control East Germany,
to solve the German question, and to prevent Germany ever
again from threatening the U.S.S.R. militarily or politically."
[Ref. 34: p. 93] Maintaining the division of that country
appeared the most feasible means to accomplish those aims.
Working to isolate the FRG within NATO would serve to
exacerbate internal Alliance tensions as well as limit West
German influence on policy decisions. For the USSR the
German question represented central political issues in
several dimensions and was therefore defined differently
than in the simple Western formula of possible reunification.
Firstly, assuming that Germany would remain divided,
fear of an eventual revival of German nationalism with its
probably "revanchist" theme made West German recognition
of post-war national borders imperative. Secondly,
Germany was the key to Western European integrative efforts.
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"In the Soviet perception, the Federal Republic of Germany
is the crucial political factor in Western Europe. Both
NATO and the European Community (EC) are seen as groupings
that would not be viable without West German participation."
[Ref. 35: p. 31] For the sake of increasing its own
influence, the USSR sought to impede progress toward
Western unity by encouraging pursuit of individual, national
interests. The tactic of bilateralism was designed to
weaken Alliance cohesion by fostering in Western Europe
"a kind of crisis of identity, a gradual erosion of
self-confidence that will prompt the countries of the area
to seek an 'accommodation' with Moscow." [Ref. 36: p. 148]
In the German case, negotiations associated with Ostpolit ik
were of special value in this respect. Lastly, and perhaps
most importantly, Germany was the prime target for the
attempt to remove, or at least severely curtail, the US
presence in Europe.
"The Soviets made no secret of their expectations that
one of the results of detente should be a certain loosening
of the ties between the US and its Western European allies."
[Ref. 37: p. 62] While geostrategic concerns (e.g. forward
defense) and other political factors (e.g. the French
withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure)
dictated concentration of NATO forces in the FRG , Soviet
manipulation of West German sentiments regarding possible
deleterious consequences of their unquestioning loyalty to
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Alliance directives could prove very profitable. By
stressing European solutions to continental problems, the
USSR hoped to divert Western European attention from
Washington toward Moscow. The press campaign to picture
a peaceful and reasonable Soviet interest in all European
affairs was designed to call into question the necessity
of NATO's continued existence. Thus, although peaceful
coexistence portrayed a superficial willingness to honor
the status quo of acknowledged state borders and spheres
of influence, that appearance did not imply an acceptance
of the existent political and social arrangements as a
permanent feature of the European system. It did, however,
provide the basis for initiating subtly subversive policies
intended to eventually normalize relations with the West.
As noted by Steibel, "'normalization' is a favorite
Soviet word, developed in the Berlin crises and implying
acceptance of Soviet conditions for settlement." [Ref. 38:
p. 26] Allied occupation of Berlin has been a completely
intolerable "abnormality" for the USSR. It was also the
most vulnerable point in the Alliance defense and as such
subjected to continual interference and harassment.
Manifestly fearful of the potential danger a reunified
Germany would present, periodic proposals to "normalize"
that situation via the scheme of a unified but neutral
Germany could only have been extended in the belief of
being able to exert a controlling influence after Allied
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troops had been withdrawn. The most "abnormal" aspect of
the European system was,, of course, the presence of
American troops. Having failed to dislodge them with
either threats or offers of conferences, Moscow decided
to change course.
Both Stalin and Khrushchev had been fond of alternating
scare tactics with pleas for peaceful cooperation. Having
learned the lesson that the former were counter-productive
and the latter distrusted, a consistent application of the
peace program was adopted. In the mid-1960s a concerted
effort was made to alter the Soviet image and convince the
West of Moscow's friendly intentions. Part of this plan
entailed increased bilateral relations with West European
countries to encourage "Western Europeans' willingness to
negotiate directly with Moscow, rather than as hitherto,
let the US speak on their joint behalf." [Ref. 37: p. 62]
By rejfraining from dire predictions of capitalism's
imminent demise and public displays of violent behavior,
Khrushchev's successors struggled to revise the common
conception of Soviet leaders. The purpose of this tactic
was two-fold. While the direct political benefit of
fostering complacency in the West was significant in its
own right, the second intent was to deflect attention away
from the Soviet military buildup taking place. Convinced
that genuine Western goodwill was def init ionally impossible.
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the only truly reliable source of security would continue
to reside in military capability.
Europeans have always been much more sensitive to the
political uses of military power than Americans. By 1969
nuclear parity had succeeded in forcing a redefinition of
the US-Soviet global relationship. At the same time an
even more perceptible change was effected in the European
theater.
The broader aspects of detente were conducive to the
belief that Moscow no longer, if ever, harbored aggressive
designs against the West. The individual Western European
states, the Kremlin thus calculated, should become less
nervous about the Soviets' intent ions
,
while at the same
time growing more impressed with Soviet power and
skeptical about the US ability to guarantee their
security. [Ref. 37: p. 62]
The altered power balance at the regional level combined
with peace propaganda proved to be a highly successful
calculation in formulating a means to "normalize" relations
with the West. The avidly desired all-European security
conference was agreed to by the West and successfully
concluded in Helsinki in 1975, with far-reaching
implications for European security.
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IV. WEST GERMAN DETENTE
A. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
Whatever vague and differing conceptions the Allied
leaders entertained regarding a German peace settlement, the
actual sequence of events that unfolded did not correspond
to anyone's expectations. Unresolved disagreement on German
policy and mutual distrust of ultimate intentions among the
occupying powers rapidly crystallized into general East-West
confrontation. Overshadowed by the intensity of this
antagonism and the higher priority attached to avoidance of
superpower armed conflict, the prospects of imminent German
reunification faded quickly. The tragedy for Germany of
that failure to cooperate was most poignantly reflected in
the unrelenting process of integration into the Western
and Eastern systems, a process predicated upon division.
For the Western zone, however, it was a highly fortunate
occurrence
.
In order to counter effectively the perceived Soviet
threat, the Western alliance needed the active political,
economic and military support of the Western zones of
Germany. In practical terms this meant the abandonment of
the original visions of a punitive program in favor of a
pragmatic course of quickly rebuilding the economy and
restoring political order. Rather than political isolation,
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acceptance of the defeated as an equal was demanded. Thus
West German participation in the Marshall Plan was permitted
and occupational controls facilitated restoration of the
political stability necessary for recovery and adjustment.
Also, an often historically subterranean stream of
liberalism contributed to the transition to democracy
required for acceptance into the Western community.
Integrative projects in all areas functioned, however, on
two levels: to encourage European recovery and unity, and
to create an interlacing system of checks on possible
future German militarism.
Although the FRG became an essential member of the
Western camp, the lingering fear of revived German
nationalism necessitated the negative aspect implicit
within the integrative arrangement. Yet the development
of the Cold War forced the implementation of a new approach
to dealing with a defeated enemy. Thus "rehabilitation"
via enforced acceptance of one's own political and social
forms displaced the traditional retaliation policy.
Integration as an "enmeshing" mechanism (i.e. a structural
constraint on policy and therefore unilateral action) for
the purpose of control substituted for the more familiar
policy of disarmament. This fundamental construct
justifying West German integration later resurfaced in
Western detente expectations vis-a-vis the East.
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Although Bonn's Eastern policy has witnessed drastic
changes since 1949, several factors have remained constant
irrespective of the government in power. Three core points
in particular provided the unwavering basis from which
later policy changes were effected.
Anti-communism was an unquestioned assumption within
both elite and public considerations. A united and
communist Germany has never been an attractive option for
the FRG. Not only was such a course initially precluded
by Allied controls and occupation, but the West Germans
themselves demonstrated a consistent desire to remain a part
of the free West. The second, and closely related, point
was the logical outcome of this attitude.
Integration with the West has formed the foundation of
all West German foreign policy. Again, one could argue that
little choice in this matter was allowed the FRG by the
Allied Powers. Yet an SPD-sponsored (Social Democratic
Party) alternative put forward during the early years
emphasizing reunification over integration was defeated
at the polls. [Ref. 39: pp. 26-27] Political and economic
advantages to be gained and dependence on others for
provision of basic security needs were determining criteria
in 1949 and remain valid to the present. Thus uninterrupted
support for Western integration has characterized Bonn's
policies from Adenauer ("The defensive power of the free
world organized under NATO safeguards peace and preserves
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the tradition of our peoples. The security of America and
Europe is today indivisible." [Ref. 40: p. 61]) through
Brandt ("We are loyal partners of the Atlantic Alliance
and energetic advocates of West European unity." [Ref. 41:
p. 147]) to Kohl ("They [the Alliance and European
Community] guarantee our security and freedom." [Ref. 42:
p. 665]). Although reunification was subordinated to state
security interests, it has remained the ultimate goal of
all foreign policy, both Eastern and Western policies being
pursued in terms of German policy. This third core issue
therefore centered on the relationship with the GDR.
Due to the lack of free elections in the GDR, the
ruling SED (Socialist Unity Party) has been considered an
illegitimate regime by the West. Bonn has consequently
refused to grant de jure recognition to the East Berlin
government. That hard line has handicapped the improvement
of relations with the GDR, yet official acknowledgement of
the existence of the other German state as a separate nation
would most likely close the door on any hope of eventual
reunification
.
These three guidelines, then, have been common threads
forming a consistency of policy orientation. During the
immediate postwar period, a "policy of strength" was
pursued vis-a-vis the East.
From 1949-1969, Ostpolitik under CDU/CSU (Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union) leadership
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accurately reflected prevailing Western ideas. In that
respect the policy could be considered a mere product of
external determining factors. Yet at the same time, those
concepts initially concurred with domestic West German
threat perceptions and consequent attitudes toward the
East. Not until the government was unable, or perhaps
unwilling, to keep pace with emerging demands of an altered
set of international circumstances did the consensus within
NATO and the FRG itself begin to show strain.
The main conventional premises associated with the
confrontational approach included the following:
1. Only with the collapse of Soviet domination could
the division of Germany and Europe be ended.
("Schroeder [Foreign Minister in the Adenauer and
Erhard governments] does not think in terms of a
sustained modus vivendi with the states of Eastern
or Southeastern Europe. Rather a modus vivendi
is an instrument to weaken the communist Soviet
domination, whose end is the prerequisite for the
inclusion of those states in a united Europe
representing its own interests." [Ref. 43: p. 95])
2. The Soviets were still pursuing an original master
plan of conquest against the FRG. ("The responsibility
for the division rests unambiguously solely on the
USSR. It possessed from the beginning a master plan
for the conquest of all Germany." [Ref. 43: p. 54])
3. Only a strong Western deterrent force could check
aggressive Soviet intent. ("Peace is only
vouchsafed by deterrence." [Ref. 43: p. 50])
4. Since the GDR was a mere creation of the USSR, the
FRG claimed sole right of representation for all
German interests. By regarding the assumption of
diplomatic relations with the GDR by a third country
an unfriendly act against itself, Bonn tried to
extend its own non-recognition policy to the
international level (the so-called Hallstein Doctrine).
("The international progress of Pankow . . . [has]
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remained exceptionally small." "We have pursued a
line of policy that consisted of enforcing as much as
possible throughout the world the right of sole
representation of the Federal Republic for all
Germany." [Ref. 43: p. 113])
5. Detente with the USSR that excluded a solution of
the German question was unacceptable since the
status quo represented the primary source of European
political tension. ("We say 'yes' to detente, if at
the same time steps are taken to settle the causes
of tension-also and especially in Germany. We say
'no' to everything that could consolidate the status
quo." [Ref. 44: p. 56])
6. Detente with the USSR was likewise impossible if it
led to recognition or even an upgrading of the status
of the GDR. ("Detente measures that lead or would
lead to the recognition or revaluation of the Soviet
zone would prejudice the claim for self-determination
for all Germans. They would therefore not be
reconcilable with President Kennedy's recently
described proviso." [Ref. 44: p. 64])
Kennedy's "peace strategy" and Brzezinski's theory of
East European nationalistic divergence from Soviet hegemonic
control, with their implications for Ostpolit ik
,
could not
be held back by Bonn. To counter growing isolation within
its own alliance, Bonn responded with a "policy of movement"
to establish trade missions in East European states and a
"policy of small steps" to begin negotiating agreements
with the GDR aimed at improving human contacts between the
two German states. Although limited progress continued
along these lines, room for maneuverability within the
CDU/CSU was highly restricted. Schroeder openly spoke out
in 1965, for example, in favor of dropping the Hallstein
Doctrine vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and resuming normal
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relations with those states. Resistance in the cabinet,
however, was far too strong to permit a meaningful move to
that degree. [Ref. 45: p. 70]
Detente did have a place in West German foreign policy,
but only in a very restricted sense. Since both Ostpolit ik
and Westpolit ik have been subordinated to Deutschlandpolit ik
,
detente was calculated to create an improved atmosphere
that would induce the USSR to relax its demands on the
German question. Recognizing that a climate of great
tension was not likely to lead to reunification, Bonn hoped
that a less defensive Moscow could be influenced to modify
its policy on the issue.
In order to defend himself against charges of having
missed chances at progress on the German question by refusing
to consider Soviet offers of negotiation (a distrust of
intent obvious in the statement that "naturally we must not
judge the Soviets by their words but rather by their actions"
[Ref. 44: p. 57]) while simultaneously moving toward the
East, Schroeder justified his program as the means of
working toward a single, immutable goal: change of the
status quo in Central Europe in the direction of a
reunification of Germany according to the Western model.
[Ref. 43: p. 138] From both Allied as well as Soviet views,
however, West German intransigence on its own demands for
a settlement proved unsatisfactory.
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Domestically, in addition to being too little too
grudgingly granted, this "policy of small steps corresponded
only to the most urgent requirements of the moment and gave
no answer to the question of the long-term new orientation
of West German politics." [Ref. 45: p. 113] Although
spoken in 1963 in a different context, Schroeder's own words
identified the reason for the break with the confrontational
platform: "a standstill can never lead to a positive change
in the status quo " [Ref. 44: p. 60] This dominating theme
of nationhood was rooted in strong historical patterns of a
search for national identity and political unity. Historical
factors also explain a general European hesitation to
restore a larger measure of self-determination to Germany.
At the heart of the controversy surrounding the "new"
West German attitute toward the East lay "old" suspicions
of German untrustworthiness and disloyalty to the West.
Some feared an eventual repeat of the Weimar experience or
a Rapallo-like intent, wondering in this if democracy had
ever taken root in the FRG. Such superficial analogies
indicate an unf amiliarity with the historical development
of Germany, the specific episodes mentioned and the special
circumstances prevailing in postwar Germany.
The principles of democracy were neither unknown nor
unsupported in the Weimar period. Since, however, the
content of any particular historical moment finds its
substance in the joining of present circumstances with past
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experiences, the factor of timing was crucial for
determining the course of events following each World War.
The origins of liberal democratic concepts, as well as
those associated with and in opposition to Ostpolit ik
,
have a historical basis fashioned within a unique
politico-cultural context.
Located in the center of the continent, the German-
speaking area of Central Europe has been repeatedly
subjected to devastating wars. In particular, the trauma
of the 30 Years' War and its concluding Peace of Westphalia
in 1648 were crucial for the subsequent development of
German history. The political settlement imposed by the
terms of the peace treaty created a mosaic of over 300
states, each jealously guarding its own right of existence
while breeding narrow, provincial attitudes. The explicitly
admitted conviction that a fragmented, and therefore weak,
central region was essential for balance of power on the
continent can be traced to this early date, although that
condition has characterized Germany's political reality
since the 11th century A.D. Not until the late 19th
century, when Bismarck forged a unified Germany, albeit a
"small" one excluding Austria, was that assumption
challenged. In the meantime, the privileged position of
the ruling class was not only ensured by treaty in 1648
but also further entrenched by two other factors.
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As a consequence of the destruction of the bourgeoisie,
"an absolutist state of official authorities and civil
servants became the main bearer of progressive improvement.
A single rule held sway: any citizen desiring to rise
higher and even partially obtain respect and material
security had to become an official in the service of this
state of authorities." [Ref. 47: p. 156] Additionally, the
psychological impact of the war effected a reinforcement
from below of this tendency to consolidate rule by the
state.
The average German citizen demanded only that the
government guarantee his physical security against domestic
disorder and foreign invasion. Obedience to established
authority was thus exchanged for personal safety. Law and
order, not individual liberties, were the requirements of
the day. Until Napoleon once again demonstrated German
powerlessness , this willingness to accept authoritarian
rule remained operant. Thus "insistence that social order
depended upon undeviating obedience to existing authorities"
[Ref. 48': p. 23] realistically corresponded to prevailing
conditions in Europe. Although these attitudes survived
beyond their usefulness into the 20th century, the
governmental form they supported did not remain immune
from attack by a rival structure.
Due to its central geographic location, Germany served
as the cross-roads of the continent, both in terms of trade
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and the exchange of ideas. The body of thought associated
with the Enlightenment offered an alternative to the
authoritarianism of the status quo . Although the
revolutions of 1830 and 1848 ended in failure, they
nonetheless gave indication of elite awareness of liberal
democratic ideals. Also, even though such ideas were not
embodied in political parties actively functioning in a
genuinely democratic state, individual rulers were
influenced to varying degrees by "enlightened" precepts.
With the passage of time a slowly increasing number within
the citizenry likewise became supporters of liberal
government. In discussing the failure of these liberal
rebellions, Craig contrasts the Western "idea of a
constitutional government, responsive to an educated and
self-reliant citizenry whose rights were clearly defined
and protected" with the German emphasis on "inner development
of the individual and of the German nation as a unique
cultural expression. ... At the same time, their
inward-directedness had induced them to leave the practical
realities of existence and the decisions affecting the life
and well-being of ordinary people in the control of the
State and its agents." [Ref. 48: pp. 33-34] Of the two
conflicting forces, the physical need for a strong,
protective state took priority over the intellectual and
spiritual yearning for realization of the self-reliant and
democratic ideal.
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Particularism, diversity, contradiction and tension
between competing drives all describe a history that in
reality defies simplification. The German experience
could perhaps most aptly be characterized as one especially
lacking in continuity.
This lack of continuity is evident in the lack of
political continuity; it is evident in the lack of
territorial continuity; it is also evident in the lack
of a continuous intellectual substance; instead of
those things there was an intellectual division with
the conflict between Roman Catholicism and the
Christianity of the Reformation, with the conflict
between a national philosophy of ideal nationhood
(nationale Heilsphilosophie) and experiential,
historical inner strife. A dualism of politico-
cultural impulses weave throughout German history and
may well open the way to its perplexing dialectic of
creative accomplishment and ruinous decline.
Intellectual-political messianism in Germany was not
used up in the process of political modernizat ion-as
was the case with neighboring peoples. Intellectual
promise became compensation for political failure.
[Ref. 49: pp. 24-25]
Unconditional defeat of the Third Reich and Allied occupation
unequivocally severed the tie of continuity with traditional
political forms. As outside forces later slowly changed the
political confrontational environment surrounding the FRG
,
internal actors rethought the underlying premises supporting
that original policy.
B. GENERAL THEORY AND GOALS
More responsive to the new factors at work internationally,
Brandt's SPD government elected in 1969 was able to put its
detente program into effect rather quickly. This apparently
rapid change of course was due to several factors. In the
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first place, a transitional period had been in progress
through much of the decade, especially during the preceding
three years of the Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD). Thus
the direction of Brandt's policy was neither a complete
departure from that of the past nor a phenomenon that
suddenly emerged full-blown. Secondly, essential preliminary
groundwork for negotiating the Eastern treaties had secretly
been accomplished prior to election to the SPD government.
[Ref. 50] Thirdly, as has been noted earlier, the ideas
now informing Ostpolitik more closely corresponded to those
demanded by the attitudes prevailing in other Western
governments. This fortuitous circumstance was crucial for
enabling the new government to implement its program, some
of which pre-dated the US-sponsored detente push.
In the role of opposition, SPD criticism of the CDU/CSU
had originally focused on a perceived sacrifice of
reunification prospects for the sake of Western integration.
Much of that disagreement derived from the party's tradi-
tional aversion to the military, a sentiment conspicuously
at odds with the antagonistic climate dominating Europe into
the 1960s. Given this distaste for a peace order founded on
military confrontation, SPD insistence on the need to
develop a politically-based international system less
reliant on armed force began early. After the rearming of
the FRG and its entry into NATO in 1955, much of the logic
of the anti-integration argument lost validity.
66
Even with defeat on that debate, however, the conviction
that confrontation was certain to seal the division of
Germany did not disappear. Under the guidance of two major
exponents, Brandt and Egon Bahr, a concrete political
platform emerged from a coalescing of new working premises.
The re-evaluation of fundamental assumptions undertaken in
the early 1960s was precipitated by one dramatic event in
particular: the construction of the Berlin Wall in
August 1961. Alliance acquiescence in that Soviet action
gave early indication of a shifting Western attitude toward
Soviet policy.
Allied agreement with Bonn's rationale that genuine
detente depended on solving the German question was the
indispensible foundation for the FRG ' s Ostpolit ik . Although
all NATO members were contractually committed to seeking
German reunification and the signing of a peace treaty, the
West in general and the US in particular conveyed even more
unmistakably an unwillingness to work toward fulfillment of
West German demands. "Voices in Washington, London, and
Paris had accused Bonn of blocking East-West detente
through insisting on the FRG ' s private conflict over
reunification." [Ref. 51: p. 21] The harsh reality of a
common goal become an individual one thoroughly eroded the
existing foundation of Bonn's working premises. At the
heart of this volte-face lay the now general Western conviction
that Germany no longer represented the main source of tension
in Europe.
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The orginal expectation that the Soviet system itself
would collapse from internal contradictions or, at a
minimum, prove unable to maintain control over Eastern
Europe was disappointed by the test of time. A more
encompassing political detente with the East, one far
exceeding mere "trade diplomacy", was inescapable if Bonn
were to avoid isolation within NATO. Brandt recognized the
need to deal with Moscow as early as 1961 when he drew
the proper conclusion from a Kennedy statement that
reunification could not be achieved against the will of
the Soviet Union: "It would follow from this that, in
order to achieve it, we must concern ourselves with
improving relations with the Soviet Union." [Ref. 41:
p. 70] These two external constraints, all but rhetorical
Alliance default on its reunification policy and the need
to negotiate with the USSR from the basis of the status quo
,
compelled the design of a new political formula predicated
on detente while dedicated to achieving reunification.
The need to alter its Eastern policy to accommodate
the West provided the immediate impetus for implementing
Ostpolit ik . As part of the overall NATO detente initiative,
the SPD program shared several general concepts and goals
with its allies. Firstly, the FRG had an undeniable
interest in reducing the likelihood of war, especially a
war most likely to be fought on its territory. The
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motivation to improve relations with the USSR, and thereby
(it was hoped) reduce the danger posed by the Soviet threat,
was therefore very strong.
Secondly, and analogous in practice to the US formulation,
the development of mutual interests across the ideological
East-West border was regarded as the most appropriate tactic
by which to attain the goal of reducing political tension.
More philosophically subtle than the overtly pragmatic
American thesis of economic enmeshment in the world system
as the means to modify Soviet international behavior, Brandt
appealed to peace as the elementary basic requirement of
Germany, Europe and indeed the entire world.
Similar to the Soviet dialectic of evolving socio-
economic systems, Brandt conceived of peace as the end
product of a historical process. It was therefore much
more than the absence of war, and mankind's desire for it
arose from an impulse much deeper than the fear of war.
Rather, peace was the ultimate achievement of historical
forces moving in the development of progress.
In his speech before the German-Atlantic Association on
September 10, 1969, in which he dealt extensively with
future political developments, he emphasized the
compulsory character of the relationship of progress and
peace: "The compulsion toward progress, the impossibility
of setting limits on scientific knowledge, the continuous
competition between peoples, these will lead to a policy
of peaceful settlement and will overcome many of today's
tensions; it will be less a matter of national than of
supranational problems." [Ref. 43: p. 150]
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On the assumption that the USSR was necessarily striving
for the peace just portrayed, measures designed to foster
Soviet trust and willingness to cooperate with the West were
promoted via Ostpolit ik . Trade, credits and loans,
technology transfer and scientific and cultural exchanges
played a correspondingly large role in West German detente
implementation. Especially great stress was placed on the
value of human contact between the blocs. Although this too
was in harmony with US theory on the anticipated beneficial
results of personal contact for the purpose of breaking
down walls of distrust and misunderstanding, Bonn's version
of this facet was more nationalistic in orientation.
The possibility of improving the living conditions of
the East German populace contributed tremendously to both
the rationale for and support of Ostpolit ik . Aware of the
long-term nature of his policy for the establishment of a new
relationship with the USSR, Brandt admitted that the "time
would seem less long and oppressive if we knew that the lives
of our people on the other side and our ties to them were
made easier." [Ref. 41: p. 99] Until such time as a
reunification could be realized according to a gradual
convergence of mutual interests superceding ideological
antagonisms, Ostpolit ik was to function as the avenue of
West German assistance to the GDR. Several modifications
to then-current premises were necessary, however, in order
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to provide a theoretical framework compatible with the
proposed and greatly expanded new Eastern program.
Bahr's now famous formula of "change via rapprochement",
first publicized in 1963, was founded on the preservation of
existing military alliances for the purpose of ensuring the
political stability necessary for that change. In its
basic outline, this new approach ran counter to many of
the ideas held by the CDU/CSU led government. In brief
summary, the main points as they were expounded in his
1963 and 1973 speeches at the Evangelical Academy in
Tutzing [Ref. 52] included:
1. Western Preconditions for the pursuit of detente
contradicted the principles of detente and thereby
hardened the confrontational attitude.
2. Any discussion of de jure recognition of the GDR
was too narrow and perhaps even dangerous in that
it led to a political Sackgasse .
3. An increase in East-West trade was in the interests
of the West, and especially Germany.
4. Such trade would not alter the character of a
communist regime, but the FRO was concerned
primarily with the human dimension of easing the
living conditions in the East. A material
improvement would naturally have the effect of
easing tension with the GDR.
5. The ideological conflict would be subordinated to
overriding mutual interests. "Fruitful coexistence",
the only viable option in a nuclear age, would
slowly displace distrust and animosity, thereby
reducing political tension and leading to a
productive living together of all European peoples.
6. The FRG was mature enough to pursue its own national
interests in this fashion.
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Although vague about the precise form the resultant
unified Europe would assume, or how it would actually
develop, the SPD platform contained sufficient concrete
points for policy implementation.
In keeping with the above, Brandt's government dropped
Bonn's previous preconditions for negotiating with the East
(while conforming, it might be added, to Soviet preconditions
[Ref. 53: p. 869]) and concluded a series of treaties
within a short span of time designed to normalize relations
between the FRG and the USSR, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The financial, exchange and humanitarian programs were
implemented as planned during the post-1969 period and have
experienced an uneven but generally progressive development.
Within these parameters Ostpolit ik confirmed and worked
from the basis of the status quo . Another important
dimension, however, was dynamic in nature and revisionist in
intent
.
C. THE GERMAN QUESTION
Within the collective framework of Western detente, the
Brandt/Bahr program hoped to continue that work toward
reunification seemingly interrupted by rejection of the
confrontational approach. What Brandt announced as a
"peace policy" and "policy of reconciliation", something
apparently conducted primarily to counter allied charges of
detente obstruction, revealed itself as a policy
72
addressed to considerably larger stakes, and to
conspicuously German ones. "Reconciliation" with the
countries of the East is simply the precondition and
starting point for an active West German strategy
designed to set in motion, and subsequently to shape,
a complex and far-reaching process of change in Europe
which will lead, at some as yet indeterminate point,
to the restoration of the German nation. [Ref. 53: p. 875]
Proceeding from an early announcement that "the
reunification policy pursued to date has failed", [Ref. 41:
p. 68] Brandt insisted that "precisely because the German
problem is so embedded in the relationship between East
and West there is no hope for us if there is no change.
Simple perseverence offers no prospects of success."
[Ref. 41: p. 93] The conviction that change was not only
essential but inevitable derived more from a sense of
dynamic evolution than a simple disillusion with past
policy. ("Whoever believes that the present unnatural
situation can ever become permanent will find that this is
an illusion." [Ref. 54: p. 30]) In short, bloc confronta-
tion cannot be "history's last word." [Ref. 43: p. 153]
The optimistic belief in the historical process to succeed
where confrontation had failed nonetheless required active
West German participation in seeking new forms of cooperation
between East and West which could then be transferred to all
of Europe. Thus the Brandt/Bahr belief that "the German
questions can only be solved within the context of an
all-European peace order" [Ref. 41: p. 201] was an effort
to rally NATO support by recasting the FRG ' s "private
concern" in the mold of a multilateral detente initiative.
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Since Germany was the nation most directly affected by
the bloc system, the FRG had a greater responsibility, a
special mission as it were, for achieving "the goal of a
European solution that would render the national solution
superfluous." [Ref. 43: p. 149] This perspective required
an emphasis on improving relations with the GDR as well as
the USSR. Yet although Brandt stressed the need to progress
from a "regulated state of living beside one another to one
of living with each other" (ueber ein geregeltes Nebeneinander
zu einem Miteinander [Ref. 44: p. 380]), official recognition
of the GDR was impossible. ("Even though two states exist
in Germany, they are not foreign to each other; their
relations to one another can only beof aspecial nature."
[Ref. 44: p. 381]) This concept of a "regulated state of
living with each other" was valid for the long-term process
of overcoming the entire East-West conflict. The proposed
change of the status quo was to be accomplished by detente,
yet did not begin from a rejection of the present bloc
organization.
Referring once again to Bahr's Tutzing speeches,
several additional points of significance emerge concerning
reunification and security affairs:
1. The GDR could only be transformed with the permission
of the USSR.
2. Any policy intended to directly overthrow the SED
regime was doomed to failure. Detente must therefore
aim at reassuring the ruling elite that its position
of power was unthreat ened
.
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3. Reunification would not occur as the result of a single
historical act, but would be the end condition of a
long-term process.
4. A system of common European security would slowly
develop out of and beyond the existing military
alliances.
5. Regional detente should be created by withdrawing
nuclear arms from non-nuclear states and balancing
conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The new Ostpolit ik initiated by Brandt has remained
consistent in its basic thrust up to the present time. The
current CDU/CSU-FDP government has been as obligated by
domestic factors to continue the policy as its SPD-FDP
predecessor was under Schmidt. In spite of repeated
warnings against entertaining unrealistic expectations of
rapid progress toward either the ultimate goal of reunifi-
cation or the interim aim of substantially reducing the
practical effects of the country's division, the achieve-
ments of Ostpolitik have left many in the FRG disappointed.
Criticism has not been confined to dissatisfaction with
Bonn's handling of the policy or the concrete results
obtained, but has also extended to questioning some of the




1 . General Comments
A recapitulation or in-depth analysis of the US-
Soviet detente initiatives implemented since 1969 is far
beyond the scope of this thesis. The disillusionment that
had engulfed Washington by 1975 is well known. To a
significant extent, American detente failures were largely
self-inflicted. Mismanagement and conceptual flaws were
weaknesses that hopeful expectations and wishful thinking
could not alleviate. Much of the anger and bitter frustra-
tion experienced, however, was caused by a simple but
persistent misunderstanding of Soviet statements.
Whether the result of mirror-imaging or the short-
sighted expediency of vested interest, US mispercept ions of
peaceful coexistence were fateful. Not prone to the internal
debate between pragmatism and morality that characterizes
American foreign policy, Soviet political objectives are
generally less ambiguously pursued and more reliably stated
than those of the US. The USSR explicitly and frequently
noted that peaceful coexistence did not equate to Soviet
acceptance of the present world order. Nor has peace been
used to mean, or necessarily imply, the lack of conflict.
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us determination to sponsor a world free of warfare
was thus rudely confronted by the Soviet insistence on
actively furthering the cause of world socialism on a grand
scale. Having repeatedly emphasized that peaceful
coexistence was the only forum available in a nuclear age
by which to continue the war against capitalism, one can
understand Moscow's surprise at the outcry evoked in
Washington by Angola and Ethiopia. A consideration of the
historical Russian expansionist proclivity, with its
conviction that the military instrument remains the final
arbitrator, would have prepared American political observers
for destablizing activity of that sort, if perhaps not for
that degree. Likewise the awesome military buildup
achieved during detente and the move into Afghanistan for
the protection of a Soviet border area were perfectly in
keeping with published Soviet security and military doctrine.
Washington's efforts to encourage change within the
Soviet system proceeded from the premise that Soviet external
behavior would not become more restrained and internationally
acceptable until a greater degree of internal liberalization
had been effected. For those attuned to the implications
for the world order of a repressive power devoted to global
aspirations, a domestic reform appeared an appropriate
method to remove the most threatening aspect of Soviet
expansion. The moral imperative to improve human living
conditions further reinforced US policy inclinations in that
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direction. Soviet leaders, however and not unexpectedly,
construed the human rights campaign as blatant interference
in their internal affairs and objected strenuously to that
linkage program.
By not taking into account the political ramifica-
tions for the Communist ruling elite of an altered domestic
policy on the Western model, Washington unwittingly
engineered the failure of detente. With the survival of the
Party, or at least its privileged position, at stake, "no
'carrot and stick' the West could use would result in
substantive changes in the system itself. The Soviet
definition of security is based on the assumption of the
legitimacy of the Soviet regime. Recognition of this
legitimacy is perceived as the minimal requirement for those
who seek constructive relations with Moscow." [Ref. 31: p. 7]
Possibilities for comparisons of Weltanschauungen as a
function of political culture are numerous and examples of
mismanagement are not lacking. The few mentioned, however,
will adequately indicate the enormity of the communication
problem in the East-West "dialogue", a condition which the
USSR often turned to its own advantage.
If "the victorious march of the Soviet Army into
Eastern Europe, Manchuria, and Korea, gave the Soviet leaders
an opportunity to resume the export of communism," [Ref. 55:
p. 3] the attainment of nuclear parity presented them
another golden one. The altered image of a peaceful but
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powerful nation increasingly able to project its influence
at will on a global basis was not lost on the world
community. To be sure, the advancing Soviet presence
precipitated by detente cannot be construed as an unbroken
string of successes. Diplomatic reversals were not
uncommon, although seldom as dramatic as was the case with
Egypt, and a certain bad reputation for relatively poor
quality and undependable delivery of goods was earned.
Equally important for many Third World countries were the
heavy-handed, rude treatment received and questionable
reliability of Soviet support (e.g. Somalia). On the whole,
however, the extent of Soviet activity was impressive and
Moscow has demonstrated an ability to learn from past
mistakes. What Moscow has not shown is the intention to
voluntarily curtail its activities. Unless confronted
with strong American resistance, Soviet leaders will
exploit the opportunity given them to pursue their
objectives. Rather than a strong stand, however, the US
was executing a global retreat, itself of immeasurable
assistance to the Soviets.
The Vietnam and Watergate experiences can scarcely
be underestimated for their impact on American domestic and,
consequently, foreign politics. The unwillingness to
maintain the previous degree of global visibility was
directly translated into a refusal to sustain the military
expenditures necessary for a credible defense posture.
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Since democracies in general possess an innate aversion to
military costs and are predisposed to balk at long-term
defense commitments, the Vietnam trauma produced a
pervasive and especially strong anti-military sentiment.
Although NATO detente policy had been formulated and
accepted on the premise of negotiations based on military
defense capability, Western governments eagerly cut defense
budgets and thereby exacerbated the growing disparity in
East -West force balances. This trend, spawned by the
rejection of a legitimate role for the military, admirably
played into Soviet hands, where Clausewitz reigns supreme.
What subsequently proved to be a misplaced confidence in the
economic instrument as a means to modify Soviet behavior
seemed to justify the relaxation of military preparedness
as well as political tensions vis-a-vis the enemy. As von
Alten noted, "it is a semantic deception to equate detente
with decreasing vigilance or even a lesser importance of
military security, and this deception is equally dangerous
for supporters and opponents of detente." [Ref. 56: p. 644]
In spite of nuclear parity and a new American
attitude of partnership founded on the acceptance of the
foe as a political equal, the US-Soviet relationship after
1969 has actually been determined by growing asymmetries.
Increased superpower divergence in the power ratio of
capability and will manifested itself most importantly, if
often subtly, in Europe. On that crucial front the USSR
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scored substantial successes while, ironically, "the European
partners discovered a new sense of solidarity, not against
the adversary to the East, but in face of the partner to
the West. To put it mildly, the new impact of detente upon
the alliance was anything but salubrious." [Ref. 38: p. 66]
At the center of East-West negotiations as well as
intra-Alliance controversy was, of course, the FRG.
2
. Implications for the German Question
A surface consideration of US-Soviet detente within
the limited context of the German question must lead to the
conclusion that both countries successfully achieved their
stated goals. The US obtained an agreement on Berlin that
supposedly guaranteed improved communications and regulated
interaction between West Berlin and the FRG and visiting
privileges between the two Berlins. In this fashion a
potentially politically volatile and the only truly "active"
issue from Potsdam days was finally defused. In return the
USSR received Western recognition of the territorial status
quo , with all the ramifications therein implied for Eastern
Europe. Initially formalized in the bilateral treaties
associated with West German Ostpolit ik , multilateral
approval followed with the Helsinki Agreement. An analysis
of the ramifications implied by these negotiations for
Western Europe, and especially for the FRG, reveals, however,
that the US certainly did not "harness the beast of detente".
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If anything, detente opened a veritable Pandora's box, the
lid of which Washington has been unable to close.
"Oversimplified, detente was supposed to liberalize
the internal and domesticate the foreign policies of the
Soviet Union and its clients. Moscow, for its part, hoped
to therewith set in motion an erosion of the Western
system." [Ref. 57: p. 294] Judged in those terms, the US
clearly failed to achieve its objectives while the USSR
made perceptible progress toward its aim. Although detente
was rooted in the status quo
,
the superpowers held
diametrically opposite notions of the significance attached
to ratification of the above treaties. "If the main effect
of negotiation is to recognize the status quo
,
the main
effect of this recognition may well be to unleash forces
that will undermine it more irresistibly than either
military pressure or diplomatic bargaining." [Ref. 58: p. 14]
The essential differences in US and Soviet policies
regarding Germany can most readily be grasped by briefly
summarizing the decisive asymmetrical security interests,
perceptions and long-term European goals motivating the two
antagonists
.
Geography represents a basic and inescapable
element of dissimilarity in superpower concern about Germany.
The US has consistently declared Western Europe an area of
vital security interest. Historic-cultural and economic
arguments supporting that valuation added force to the more
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traditional balance-of-power rationale. Domination of all
Europe would simply make Soviet power too great. The
political decision having therefore been taken to contain
Soviet expansion, military considerations (e.g. intelligence
collection, ASW, air defense, stationing of troops) likewise
required protection of Western Europe. The key continental
country, politically, economically, militarily and
geostrategically , for that defense is the FRG . Yet the
physical distance between North America and Europe
unavoidably acts to militate against the latter being an
absolutely indispensable military necessity for the former.
Washington's degree of commitment simply cannot be as great
as that of Moscow, itself a European capital. "Although the
United States has the dual status of a global power and a
self-appointed European power, there is no inherent
harmony between the two. This contradiction is exploited
by the Soviet Union, whose geography casts it in the role
of a global and European power." [Ref. 59: p. 312]
Believing the West to be hostile by nature to its
very existence, Soviet leaders tend to regard the continental
division in terms of survival. Twentieth-century
experiences with Germany have not predisposed Moscow to
view with equanimity the dramatic recovery of the FRG to a
prominent position in the West. Although the USSR firmly
controls the bordering Eastern European countries, the FRG,
both as site of massed NATO forces and home of allegedly
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militant "revanchists" , has been perceived by the USSR as
a fundamental security threat. Soviet foreign policy in the
European theater has revolved around West German military
issues. In attempting to provide security on its Western
front, the Soviets engaged in a two-pronged tactical
maneuver: an unprecedented military force buildup at the
regional level and SALT negotiations with the US at the
global level. Asymmetrical purposes for arms-control
measures, however, have likewise adversely affected the
American role in Germany.
Primarily occupied with the overall balance of
intercontinental nuclear armaments, the US concentrated on
limitations of total numbers with little regard to the
deployment distribution of systems of other ranges. As
mentioned earlier, NATO acceptance of detente, at US
urging, and West German initiation of Ostpolit ik were
predicated upon the twin pillars of negotiations and
defense. The Western decision to reduce defense spending
as a result of relaxed tension with the USSR contributed
substantially to the growing theater force imbalance. A
failure to provide strong, consistent leadership as well
as a satisfactory SALT agreement did much to weaken the
official US rationale for detente in Europe, which had
been "based on an assumption of continuing stability in
that area." [Ref. 60: p. 193] The net impact of the
military disparity resulting from "instabilities in the
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strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington will
tend to weigh rather heavily on the core area of the
political confrontation between East and West, Central
Europe." [Ref. 61: p. 100] Having gained the military
advantage from a combination of American mismanagement of
detente and a planned force buildup, which began only
after the US and Western Europe were committed to strategic
stability, [Ref. 62: p. 110] the USSR also extracted
political benefits from SALT.
Unlike the US, which has persistently been reluctant
to admit the political function of military power and has
recently shown itself ever more unwilling to commit
military force as a means to effect political goals, the
USSR is acutely aware of the potential gains to accrue from
a correlation of military power and political ambitions.
"For the Soviet Union, SALT had always been an endeavor to
change political structure in the Western alliance rather
than reduce strategic forces to lower levels." [Ref. 63:
p. 5] The all-important goal of Soviet policy in Western
Europe has remained the replacement of the US presence with
that of its own. Implications of the essential link
between detente and defense, publicized by the West but
implemented by the East, were clearly drawn by Nerlich:
"The long-term policital strategy of the Soviet Union,
where the buildup of military power and a willingness to
enter into negotiations are designed mutually to reinforce
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each other in pursuing the goal of gradual political changes
in Europe, aims to dissolve the structures of American-West
European cooperation and thus the commitment to share all
risks." [Ref. 64: pp. 20-21] Thus the attainment of
regional, and in some aspects global, military superiority-
fostered an increasing Western European accommodationist
attitude toward Moscow. American nuclear credibility
became questionable in terms of both capability as well as
intent. Soviet appeals to West German, and to a lesser
extent Western European, desires to overcome the division
of the continent were likewise calculated to weaken
Alliance ties.
Of the several asymmetries distinguishing US and
Soviet interests in Europe, that of the future vision of
the continent is most striking. A crucial motivational
distinction must be drawn between the conflicting views
of what the term " status quo " actually denotes. A
superpower political equilibrium was established with the
partitioning of Europe in 1945 that has since remained
undisturbed. Although not necessarily reflective of power
equality, that division has symbolized
a standoff in competitive power between two sides that is
mutually acceptable. . . . The statesmen on both sides
not only accept the situation but prefer it to any
foreseeable alternative. The status quo becomes a
standard of the acceptable balance of power, and so long
as neither side moves to alter it or perceives that it
is being altered the equilibrium will continue. The
difference between stalemate and equilibrium is that in
a stalemate one or both sides would change conditions if
they could and are seeking means to do so . (Emphasis added)
[Ref. 65: pp. 18-19]
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An acceptance of the equilibrium as a status quo due to lack
of other viable options accurately describes only the
immediate post-war period. Even at that time, however,
Moscow was not advocating balance-of -power politics or
surrendering to pan-European goals. Van Oudenaren has
perceptively pointed out that
in the Soviet view the essence of the status quo is its
capacity for constant change. . . . Just as the Brandt
government accepted the status quo in order to change it,
so the Soviets, having attained their minimum territorial
requirements vis-a-vis Western Europe, and having
stabilized Eastern Europe by military intervention, were
ready to accept and work within the Western status quo
,
the better to influence and ultimately undermine it.
[Ref. 66: p. 162]
Washington's perception of the status quo stands in sharp
contrast to Moscow's destabilizing intentions.
Satisfied with the present political structure, the
US seemingly wishes nothing more than a maintenance of a
static defense within the current NATO framework. The
implicit assumption of US leadership within the Alliance
remains active, but no longer accurately reflects the
original situation. For although both superpowers accepted
the status quo
the same interest in maintaining the structure has
allowed of great differences in the process, and the
result of the different processes at work in East and
West is that Western Europe has become more disorganized
and less important, and that Eastern Europe has become
more highly organized, has come under firmer Soviet
control, and that Soviet interests there have become more
and more difficult to distinguish from Soviet interests
at home. But that is not all.
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Western Europe was central to American policy-making not
only in the period of the Cold War, but also while the
United States was working out the nature of detente. The
policies of linkage, as they were developed and articulated
by the United States, began, however, to reduce this role.
. . . This wide interdependence also meant that Western
Europe was down-graded as a central criterion of American
policy. [Ref. 67: p. 39]
European detente having primarily progressed on a divisible
basis, that is, according to Soviet plans, the Alliance
leadership role of the US has eroded noticeably.
American preoccupation with other global concerns
built a case for legitimate Western European claims of
having also suffered "benign neglect". Since the West
Europeans were obliged to conduct detente-related initiatives
with Moscow on a bilateral basis, the USSR was able to
encourage the pursuit of more nationalistic and individualis-
tic policies by the European allies than was previously the
case. Apparently able to conceive of and offer only two
possibilities of Soviet policy, those of confrontation or
detente, US efforts to revert to the former were increasingly
resisted by European partners. Soviet regional military
preponderance and the tangible financial interests resulting
from East-West trade agreements worked in tandem to create
intra-Alliance friction on the issue of "continuing" detente.
The US bid to recapture the diplomatic initiative failed
due to an altered Western European, and especially West
German, domestic political scene that would not tolerate a
return to the Cold War.
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The Kremlin also scored a success with CSCE. The
signing of the Helsinki Agreement was used by the USSR to
set in process a propaganda campaign that may prove
ominously significant for NATO cohesion. Once again,
the contrast in US-Soviet perspectives on the meaning of
CSCE was' symptomatic of their incompatible regard for the
status quo . "While Brezhnev in his comments on the
conference stressed that he saw it as a major political
fact marking the 'close of an era', President Ford said
that he regarded CSCE not as a surrogate peace conference,
but as part of a process, 'a challenge, not a conclusion.'"
[Ref. 68: pp. 189-190] By thus serving notice of a more
confrontational attitude and a dissatisfaction with detente,
the US displayed an unawareness of, or insensit ivity to,
the mood and needs of the FRG. In the Soviet estimation,
however, an evolutionary process of change began with CSCE
that inaugurated a new era of "irreversible detente".
Although the participation of the US in the Helsinki
Conference represented a major Soviet tactical concession in
that it tacitly acknowledged legitimate American interests
in Europe, it did not connote a strategic compromise by
accepting those interests as permanent. Given past
experiences, present world conditions and the conviction
of future victory, Moscow has simply opted for a more
subtle and sophisticated propaganda campaign against the
FRG in particular and the West in general by which to
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achieve its immutable final aims. This strategm may well
prove highly effective due to Soviet ability and willingness
to prosecute a long-term policy of slowly accruing gains.
For this reason
The Soviet Union no longer asks (or pretends to ask) for
the dissolution of the blocs and the withdrawal of the
United States. She wants, within the existing structures,
to encourage a shift in the psychological balance, in the
comparative unity and dynamism of the two superpowers,
the two alliances, the two Europes , the two Germanies,
the two Berlins. Her preferred solution is an American
presence real enough to exercise some control over
Germany and to prevent military efforts in Western
Europe and false hopes in Eastern Europe, yet declining
and uncertain enough to create doubts in West European
countries - again, especially in Germany - and to prompt
them to look for reassurance in accommodation to her.
[Ref. 58: p. 31]
The past decade has witnessed remarkable progress toward
realization of this situation.
If Helsinki "authorized" an American influence in
the FRG, it certainly implied permission of the same for
the USSR, which quite naturally had long claimed that
right on the basis of geographic considerations. The CSCE
Final Act was heralded by Soviet authorities as the frame-
work within which all future European affairs would be
conducted. In presenting that agreement as the political
"settlement" of unresolved World War II issues, the USSR
could then demand Western European cooperation and
consultation on all matters within the context of that
structural arrangement, thereby forcing a
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favorable change in Europe "from above" as it were.
. .
.
Since Helsinki the Soviets have in fact interpreted
the final act as a document giving the USSR a formal,
quasi-juridical right to be consulted in the affairs of
Western Europe and to exercise an influence over the
process of economic and political integration in the West.
... The thrust of the Soviet line is that under CSCE
auspices Western Europe is committed to seeking all-European
solutions to problems, which in effect means that East-West
talks must take precedence over unilateral actions.
[Ref. 66: p. 168]
The argument that a crucial change has already occurred and
can be neither reversed nor circumvented is a powerful
psychological device for inducing a sense of helpless
inevitability. The accompanying feeling of having been
caught up in uncontrollable and unrelenting forces can
yield to a paralysis of the will and an automatic acceptance
of Soviet political doctrine. For obvious reasons, the
FRG is the Western country most susceptible to this ploy
of "mental" fait accompli . Adroit Soviet exploitation of
West German fears of war has carved deep niches in the
previously unchallenged acceptance of American leadership
in NATO. More importantly, though, Soviet recasting of
national foreign policy goals in terms of "peace" rather
than "freedom" has allowed detente rhetoric to manipulate
basic existential impulses that could finally prove fatal
to the Alliance.
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B. SOVIET-WEST GERMAN DIMENSION
1. General Comments
Because the USSR is both a regional and a global
power, the two levels of Soviet detente participation
intersected in Germany. With Washington regarding Berlin
as the limited agenda for shared US-Soviet interests in
Germany, Moscow began to exploit the political and economic
advantages offered by a divisible detente. Since the primary
goals of Soviet detente were Western recognition of the
territorial status quo and international acceptance of the
GDR, with both serving to stabilize East-West and intra-
Warsaw Pact relations, negotiations with the FRG were of
central importance. Before initiating its campaign, however,
the Kremlin had to counteract unfavorable repercussions from
its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. A principal consequence
of that action had been "a reversal of the trend towards
fragmentation in the Western alliance prevalent during
preceding years. This trend had been due not only to the
specific policies conducted by President de Gaulle but also
to a more general feeling of transatlantic alienation
caused in part by the war in Vietnam." [Ref. 69: p. 4]
By the end of 1969, the interrupted detente impulse had
been restored and negotiations had begun.
The prospects of effectively sowing discord within
the Western alliance appeared sufficiently alluring for a
compromise of de jure for de facto recognition by Bonn of the
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GDR. That retreat from a past position and acceptance of the
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin were the meager concessions
to rapprochement that enabled the Kremlin to obtain West
German acknowledgement of the European status quo . The FRO,
however, exchanged "possession" goals (to achieve the freedom
of the German people in the East and eventual German
reunification in a democratic system) for the "milieu" goal
of detente (to promote a reorganization of Europe). [Ref. 70:
p. 78] Although in so doing it acceded to Alliance desires
and provided a basis for creation of a viable modus vivendi
with the East, "Willy Brandt's 'new' Ostpolit ik and
Deutschlandpolit ik were policies of resignation, realizing
that West Germany had to accept what existed in order to
strengthen Bonn's position vis-a-vis the East." [Ref. 71:
p. 21] Just as US-Soviet policies on Germany reflected a
disparity of interest, the course taken by Ostpolit ik
and the ensuing results were largely determined by
asymmetrical factors of crucial importance.
In the first instance, the USSR very much wanted the
fruits of detente whereas the FRG actually needed them.
Having persuaded the West German public of the necessity of
a revised Eastern policy and having subsequently produced
tangible benefits therefrom, the SPD was, and is, committed
to maintaining the policy of detente as a matter of
political survival. "Continuity" has been a key slogan of
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the current CDU/CSU-FDP government , therein revealing an
undeniable domestic demand for Ostpolit ik .
Every Federal Government must take into account the special
responsibility deriving from the divison of our country and
its geographical location on the border towards the east.
Pursuing an active policy for peace towards the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe continues to be the task of
German foreign policy. The interests of the people have
priority for us. On the basis of the valid treaties and
the final act of Helsinki, the Federal Government will
continue to work towards genuine detente, dialogue and
cooperation. We want to do everything in our power to make
the division of Germany and Europe more bearable for the
people affected and to maintain good relations with our
neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. The Federal
Government will devote particular attention to relations
with the Soviet Union and work for their continual
development. [Ref. 72: pp. 5-6]
The lack of a viable alternative to Ostpolit ik for the
Federal Republic clearly demonstrates the unequal nature of
the Soviet-West German dialogue.
Secondly, the absence of strong US support forced the
FRG to conduct its policies strictly from its own power base.
In spite of its economic strength and political significance
within the Western alliance, the FRG was simply not a strong
enough state to compete on an equal basis with the Soviet
superpower. Even if Moscow had not disposed of the means to
resolve the German question according to Bonn's wishes,
political leverage could only have been generated from the
Soviet side. Operating under the twin constraints of
domestic political imperatives and an inferior power position,
Bonn became a special target of Soviet attempts to weaken
NATO cohesion.
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In its drive to exacerbate the "internal contradic-
tions" operant in the West, the USSR scored its greatest
success with the FRG.
Among all European countries, West Germany is certainly the
one which is-given its partition and its location on the
borders of the Soviet empire-the most committed to detente.
It is also the one which has benefited most from what have
been called the "dividends" of detente. Ostpolit ik gave
Germany the political dimension that the Federal Republic
was lacking up until the 1970s: it permitted Germany's
international recognition, and above all it turned the
Federal Republic into the center of gravity of East-West
relations in Europe. In the process, the United States
(and, to a lesser degree, France) in many respects lost
the initiative in dealings with the East. The Soviets in
turn won a precious "advocate" within NATO as well as the
means to push forward their policy of decoupling "European
detente" from US-Soviet relations. [Ref. 73: p. 821]
This summation of the political significance of detente for
the main European actors gives a clear indication of some of
the important strategic points won by the Soviets. A less
obvious, but potentially more dangerous, Soviet gain has
been registered at the psychological level.
The main objective of the Soviet peace program was
not to arrange a brief breathing spell for purposes of
recovery, as in times past, but rather to alter fundamentally
the threat perception held in the West. The presentation of
an appearance of a genuine Soviet desire to peacefully
coexist (as defined in Western terms) within the status quo
did much to revise the image of an aggressive "Russian bear".
In fact, the absence of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe
has encouraged revisionist historians in the West to infer
the non-existence of such an intent at any time and to impute
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purely defensive motives to the Kremlin's leaders. To no
longer consider the USSR a threat would undercut the very
rationale for NATO's existence. At the same time, the USSR
had to guard against a parallel danger affecting Warsaw
Pact cohesion.
Moscow had been constrained to downplay the "revanchist"
theme in order to transform the FRG into a legitimate detente
trade partner. This modified version of the German threat
presented a dilemma, however, for rationalizing the continued
Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. An unending
stream of Soviet propaganda castigating the FRG for its
alleged aggressive designs on the lost Eastern territories
had served since 1945 to justify the Soviet occupation of
those countries. Removal of that sense of urgent threat
created a potential control problem in that area. "The 'need
for enemies' is a fundamental element in the philosophy of
the Soviet system, not only as a remnant of the revolutionary
era but also because it serves a vital function in the
cohesion and legitimization of totalitarian systems."
[Ref. 74: p. 21] The "reformed revanchist" motif has proven
of ephemeral value, however, to the FRG.
The West German gains associated with reduced Soviet
rhetoric concerning "revanchism" could momentarily be
withdrawn by the Kremlin and used as a cudgel to express
disapproval of any given West German action. Attention to
Soviet statements concerning the FRG could, in fact, provide
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an accurate barometric reading of Moscow's pleasure (or lack
thereof) with Bonn. "It would be an illusion, therefore, to
hope to arrive at a genuine climate of detente with the
Soviet Union: all that can be achieved is the conditional
cessation of particular verbal attacks and epithets."
[Ref. 74: p. 21] Given the domestic demand for Qstpolit ik
and the general aversion to propaganda characteristic of
democracies, Bonn often did not adequately defend its
position against Soviet manipulation of threat percept ions
.
Thus in the area of "image control" the USSR also enjoyed
an asymmetrical advantage. A Soviet disadvantage derived
from detente, similar in nature to that posed by threat
perception management but of greater portent, concerned
support of "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Accords.
Helsinki placed Moscow in the uncomfortable position
of being liable to charges of failing to adhere to the human
rights requirements expected of all signatories. On the
one hand, European acceptance of the territorial status quo
provided an aura of legitimacy for Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe, thereby aiding in the reinforcement and
maintenance of control. Conversely, increased contact with
the West via trade and exchanges created "penetration effects"
that made Soviet dominance seem less legitimate. Thus,
"leaving aside the fundamental incongruence between 'peaceful
coexistence' and 'detente', . . . the Soviet Union is caught
between the demands of the 'class struggle' — its very raison
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d'etre as a revolutionary power--and those of detente and
related criteria of political performance." [Ref. 23: p. 235]
The "liberalizing" tendency inherent within increased exposure
to the West, a primary purpose of West German Ostpolit ik ,
'
introduced an unwelcome degree of external influence hinting
at possible control difficulties within the Warsaw Pact.
To combat the potentially destablizing results of
Ostpolit ik
,
Soviet "detente" (more accurately described as
"peaceful coexistence") has been an attempt to divide it
into acceptable (trade, credits, loans, technology transfer)
and unacceptable (open borders, increased contact and
communication) components. The GDR also has proven especially
sensitive to distinctions between the two categories. From
the very beginning East Berlin has provided abundant evidence
that it will favorably respond to Bonn's initiatives only to
the extent that Moscow enforces compliance with them or that
the financial gains sufficiently outweigh the potential
political dangers. The SED policy of "demarcation"
( Abgrenzung ) in reply to the SPD ' s "change via rapprochement"
accurately represented, albeit in extreme form, the Eastern
position on human contact between East and West. Eastern
efforts to curtail the perceived Western interference in
Eastern internal affairs have contradicted core political
premises and policy motivations informing West Germany's
Ostpolit ik
,




2 . Implications for the German Question
When considering the results of Ostpolit ik for the
FRG, one must be careful to distinguish between the means
and the ends. Specifically, the purpose of the new Eastern
policy was to relax political tension through a concentration
on mutual interests in the hope of permitting a gradual
convergence of the two halves of Europe. An overarching
European solution marked by trust , open borders and
cooperative interdependence would, of course, inherently
include a German one also. Thus the economic cooperation
thought by Brandt to be the single most important contri-
bution to detente, in the name of improving the political
climate, [Ref. 43: p. 255] must be judged in terms of
altered political atmosphere and progress toward reunification
rather than of trade volume or credits extended per se .
Even though "economic detente" appeared to be a
mutually-held goal (although actually viewed differently as
regards ultimate purpose), Bonn's hope for an encompassing
convergence was not shared by the East. "The basic paradox
of the Soviet policy of coexistence lies in the Soviet
leaders' attempts to retain Western acceptance and support
of a policy that simultaneously advocates cooperation with
the Western nations to avoid war and intensification of
ideological warfare to bring about capitalism's eclipse."
[Ref. 75: p. 17] West German frustration and disappointment
with the Eastern refusal to cooperate with the FRG ' s detente
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policy have produced elements of resignation to the
obstreperous behavior of the GDR, which has clung almost
unabatedly to its zero-sum attitudes. An accompanying
resignation with regard to the futility of detente itself
has not, however, been registered.
The FRG • s firm commitment to try alleviating the
effects of the continent's division has created a situation
in which Bonn has left itself open to Soviet and East German
manipulation. This leverage, such as it was and is, has been
primarily a product of Bonn's own creation rather than Soviet
design. Some of that persistence, in all fairness to Bonn,
was dictated by the long-term aspect of Ostpolit ik and the
domestic requirement to obtain at least perceptible progress
on announced goals. ("A new relationship between East and
West is required and, as part of that, a new relationship
between the Soviet Union and Germany. Time is needed for
that." [Ref. 41: p. 99] As Schmidt pointed out, as a
justification for adhering to detente, "since 1975, since
Helsinki, more than 225,000 Germans were allowed during a
period of six years to leave Poland and come to the Federal
Republic. In the previous six years the corresponding figure
was only 68,000." [Ref. 76: p. 5]). In the terms of
analysis mentioned above, however, Ostpolit ik has achieved
little progress in attaining its theoretical goals.
The detente period has not yielded a permanent
or marked degree of relaxation in political tension nor
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redressed the conventional force imbalance in Europe.
Rather than evolving toward a reduction in and subsequent
removal of nuclear arms, the bloc system has recently been
further emphasized by weapons modernization and the
asymmetrical trend of US nuclear reductions in Europe
countered by Soviet increases. In general, the GDR has
seldom demonstrated a willingness to comply with the
provisions of the FRG-GDR Basic Treaty, a condition clearly
obstructing West German reunification hopes. This overall
state of affairs has led critics of Ostpolit ik on both sides
of the Atlantic to claim that Bonn not only "sold out" by
granting de facto recognition ("It is self-evident that
Bonn's new policy toward East Germany runs a high risk of
perpetuating the very partition it seeks to attenuate."
[Ref. 77: p. 301]) but also made the FRG a hostage to Soviet
goodwill for the purpose of forcing East German adherence to
treaty provisions.
The consequences for the FRG of having given the USSR
its primary political goal of territorial recognition were
twofold. Firstly, that formal acceptance of the status quo
comprised Bonn's only bargaining chip in its negotiations
with Moscow. Although Brandt could argue that nothing had
been given away that was not already lost as a result of
defeat in World War II, the CDU/CSU opposition would have
preferred greater Soviet concessions on Berlin and guarantees
of consistent East German compliance with the Basic Treaty.
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As viewed by Strauss, for instance, detente has been reduced
to "at best a set of Western policies of unilateral deference
to Moscow at the expense of the interests of the Free World."
[Ref. 78: p. 12]
Secondly, having allowed Moscow the initiative, the
West German government became dependent on detente progress
for its own domestic popularity. Hartley prophetically noted
in 1971 that
The government of the Federal Republic has indeed got
itself into the uneasy position of being dependent on
Russian goodwill for its own internal political success.
An Ostpolit ik which began as the cautious exploration of
possibilities has now become the essential ingredient of
Herr Brandt's policies. The very fact that there can be
discussion as to whether Moscow will choose to aid him by
concessions on the Berlin question or will reserve its
favors for a successor Christian Democrat regime suggests
that his government may have lost some of its freedom of
action. The euphoria which reigned in West Germany following
the conclusion of the Moscow treaty, the approval voiced by
politicians and public opinion polls, make any retreat all
the more difficult. Here again the advantageous position
gained by Russian diplomacy is not the fault of the German
negotiators. It was very much inscribed in the facts of
an unequal dialogue. [Ref. 79: p. 275]
What was true at that time has remained valid to the pr,e«ent
.
"Having hitched its electoral fortunes to Ostpolit ik and
reconciliation, the SPD is condemned to demonstrate forever
the viability of detente, for the sake of its survival in
power." [Ref. 80: p. 212] The installation of a CDU/CSU-FDP
government in 1982, likewise committed to an uninterrupted
continuance of detente, indicated the domestic constraints
operant in West German foreign policy. In the estimation
of Windsor, Ostpolit ik has accordingly failed in its objectives
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of facilitating the establishment of a new European peace
order in which prospects for eventual reunification could
be promoted and preserved:
Willy Brandt's express hope had been that a more flexible
pattern of relations could emerge in Europe once West
Germany had explicitly accepted the status quo. . . .However,
these hopes were soon dashed. The East German response was
the policy of Abgrenzung ; that is, a division of functions
in the relationship she entertained with the Federal
Republic. . . . Abgrenzung implied a particular Soviet
view of the Germany problem. This problem lay no longer in
the potentially disturbing effects on Eastern Europe of a
powerful Federal Republic dedicated to changing the status
quo; it lay now in the potential threats to stability in
the East which could arise from a close relationship between
the two Germanies. These were not to be permitted to
develop to any such point. Detente, in Soviet eyes, should
remain a limited and non-dynamic condition of international
relations, particularly as it affected Eastern Europe.
[Ref. 81: pp. 5-6]
Evidence of the above evaluation was recently
provided when Moscow persuaded SED chief Honecker to postpone
indefinitely the visit to the FRG that had been scheduled
for September 1984. Apparently both Germanys were beginning
to take Ostpolit ik objectives a bit too seriously for
Moscow's comfort. From the Soviet viewpoint, German
reunification was, and is, a dead issue. From the West
German perspective, however, Ostpolit ik theory and goals
remained operant. Yet considering actual political results,
and allowing for the long-term factor within the Brandt/Bahr
concept, an analysis of the post-19G9 period must nevertheless
conclude that basic assumptions critical for success of that
theory did not correspond to the reality of the situation.
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A crucial underpinning of the entire Brandt/Bahr
concept was the assumption that a similar mental process was
at work in Kremlin leaders. It seemed inconceivable in the
West that a certain "obvious" rationale had not been accepted
by all "reasonable" men and the "logical" conclusions drawn
therefrom. Specifically, Western governments were convinced
that the doctrine of deterrence was understood and accepted
by the Soviets in the same terras as in the West. Proceeding
on the basis of these shared "facts", it was a simple matter
to impute altered foreign policy goals to the USSR and appeal
to Moscow as if it too quite naturally had the same common
interests invested in detente.
Brandt believed that the USSR, prior to his Ostpolit ik
had "wanted a peace on the basis of the status quo, i.e. on
confrontation and the division of Europe, a peace at the
expense of Germany." [Ref. 45: p. 156] In this he identified
a reactionary power, one concerned primarily with obtaining
written concurrence with the results of World War II and
thereby strengthening its position as much as possible.
[Ref. 43: p. 155] This estimation changed in April 1970 when
he claimed that the USSR had altered its status quo policy
vis-a-vis the FRG in order to establish better relations
with Vi^estern Europe and the US. [Ref. 43: p. 156]
On the basis of that Soviet willingness to improve
relations and the mutually-desired wish to avoid nuclear war,
the SPD-led government proceeded to ascribe its own goals
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and motivations to Moscow. Bahr therefore advocated accepting
the opponent as a partner since security in a nuclear age
was only possible with him rather than against him. [Ref. 82:
p. 425] The emphasis on exploiting areas of mutual interest
to create trust and cooperation, the belief in the power of
rising economic standards to achieve progressively greater
political stability and liberalization, and the desire to
include the East in the world community for the purpose of
control by integration all agreed with the Nixon/Kissinger
concepts of 1969-1974. These ideas also closely described
the actual West German post-1945 experience in which a
possible threat had been contained via "enmeshing" it within
the Western system. The greatest confidence-building
measure the FRG could contribute to the detente concept was
acceptance of the territorial status quo on "the assumption
that the recognition of existing international boundaries
would neutralize antagonisms and reduce tensions." [Ref. 83:
p. 86] The fundamental flaw in this theory was the premise
that Soviet animosity had dissolved into an amicable desire
to help realize the SPD vision of the future.
In spite of the USSR's desire to avoid nuclear war
and improve relations in order to obtain financial and
technical assistance, one cannot logically infer an altered
Soviet political intent vis-a-vis the West. The USSR has
very explicitly outlined what "peaceful coexistence" means.
"Ideological" detente has consistently been disavowed and
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the defeat of capitalism and the establishment of Soviet-
controlled "socialism" has remained Moscow's principal
foreign policy objective. Revolutionary goals, if not
always overtly revolutionary means, still characterize
Soviet policy. Far from a satiated status quo power, the
USSR entered into negotiations with the FRG with a dynamic
concept in mind that was not intended to create the unified
Europe of Brandt and Bahr. Finland, rather than any type
of partnership, has officially been acclaimed as the model
state upon which all others should patt.ern their relations
with Moscow. A one-sided Soviet security concept, bearing
no resemblance to Bahr's "fruitful coexistence" and military
disengagement, has characterized that relationship. A
Soviet-style "socialist" solution to the European division
has long been the espoused goal of the Soviets. By ignoring
Soviet statements and supplying the acknowledgement of the
territorial status quo demanded by the Soviets, Bonn placed
itself in a position of being subject to Soviet control of
the political initiative.
A basic internal contradiction also marred the theory
The political convergence envisioned required "a greater
degree of national independence and certain politico-ideolo-
gical emancipation from the USSR. Yet at the same time the
originators of the concept wanted to have the desired process
of change run its course with the complete agreement of the
hegemonic Soviet power." [Ref. 46: p. 114] Recognizing that
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the roads to all East European capitals ran through Moscow,
Soviet willingness to work toward a future Europe based on
the Western model was crucial for success of the SPD plan.
Since destruction, not further expansion, of the Western
system was, and is, the goal of Soviet Westpolit ik
,
the
enormity of the error in assuming like intent is readily
apparent
.
One facet of Abgrenzung
,
by way of example, diame-
trically opposed cherished Western detente theory. The
concept of encouraging internal change through economic
improvement was defied by the East Berlin government.
Although trade with the West had strengthened the SED regime,
it had not reduced the sense of threat perceived by an
illegitimate government in competition with a more appealing
political alternative. Consequently, a stricter control
over both foreign and domestic affairs has been instituted
rather than a greater degree of liberalization fostered.
"Indeed, the evolution of the DDR [GDR] was plainly
developing in a way which ran counter to the general
assumption that economic decentralization leads to political
pluralization." [Ref. 84: p. 120]
Unlike the de Gaulle formulation for overcoming the
power and politico-structural opposition of the two blocs
via an altered East-West relationship, that of the SPD
assumed a basis of entente for the detente justifying
cooperation. The French formula, on the other hand, had
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called for three consecutive phases of detente, then entente
and, finally, cooperation. In its haste to work patiently
toward a long-term goal, the Brandt/Bahr program took for
granted the second element, using it to initiate the first
as an excuse to immediately plunge into the third. Once
again, the weakness of the theory was demonstrated by
Soviet word and deed contradicting its imputed agreement
with the West
.
A final problem concerned the role assigned ideology
in the new Europe. Brandt was of the option that "ideolo-
gical opposition does not at all need to stand in the way of
genuine dialogue." [Ref. 41: p. 146] Wehner was even more
explicit when he discussed the projected "confederation":
"We do not demand that Communists must stop being
Communists. . . . Everything that the people in their part
of Germany do not expressly want to have changed . . . they
must be able to retain." [Ref. 44: p. 155] Although the SPD
was vague about the actual form to be assumed by its future
Europe, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine the two
ideologies remaining in place yet somehow ineffectual.
Ideology about legitimate political order is the crux of the
East-West conflict and cannot be anesthetized by cultural
exchanges and trade ventures.
The USSR has neither declared an ideological truce
nor regarded Ostpolit ik an anything other than an attack on
its own established political order in Eastern Europe. In
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short, "the real problem in relations between the West and
the Soviet Union is that their aims of realizing European
and world peace are largely irreconcilable, and even
antagonistic." [Ref. 85: p. 1] It was a collective Western
blunder to unilaterally decide for Moscow that its aims
were also Moscow's. It was a specific West German blunder
to decide that greater Alliance support for reunification
could be garnered by subsuming the national goal within the
greater European issue.
C. US-WEST GERMAN DIMENSION
1. General Comments
In deference to the "voices in Washington and London"
encouraging greater responsibility for conduct of its own
foreign affairs, the FRG embarked on detente in order to
avoid isolation within the West. ("The FRG is in a certain
respect catching up in the normalization of its relations with
the countries of Eastern Europe, something its allies have
already completed." [Ref. 41: p. 292]). Initial US-West
German collaboration on detente policy had centered on
negotiating a Berlin agreement and convening an all-Europe-
an Security Conference with US and Canadian participation.
Never very enthusiastic about the latter, the successful
signing of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1971 allowed
Washington to shift its attention away from Europe and
concern itself with more pressing global affairs (most
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notably concluding its involvement in the Vietnam conflict
and discussing strategic nuclear issues with Moscow).
In divorcing itself from regionally important issues,
the US created the opportunity for a divisible detente to
unfold. Although Washington expressly wished to prevent
that very development, its failure to participate actively
on behalf of the FRG compelled Bonn to conduct the unequal
detente dialogue with Moscow described above.
It is important to remember that the Ostpolit ik launched
ten years ago depended, and continues to depend, on the
leverage provided by the United States. It was Moscow's
interest in a broader understanding with the United States
(symbolized, among others, by SALT I) which allowed
Washington to impose a link between the convening of the
European Conference on Security and Cooperation (ECSC)
and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. [Ref. 80: p. 211]
The absence of that link between the global, regional and
German detente process permitted Soviet exploitation " of a
loosening transatlantic tie.
Much of the intra-NATO detente controversy was more
an "Atlantic" problem than a specifically West German one.
Bonn, however, received more unfavorable attention from
Washington because of 1) its strategic importance for NATO,
2) its previous record of compliance with US policy
preferences, 3) its vulnerability to Soviet political
blackmail concerning Ostpolit ik , 4) its assumption of a
continental leadership role that promised to be instrumental
in progressively forming a more viably united European front
within the Alliance and, 5) a questionable SPD flirting with
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more accomodating attitudes vis-a-vis Moscow for the sake of
"bridging" the superpower detente gap. Thus the value of
the FRG , in military, political and economic terms, its
apparent sincerity in actually pursuing reunification under
a new guise, and its vested interests in maintenance of
Ostpolit ik marked Bonn for pressure from West as well as
East. In a word, the source of Alliance discord was the
division of detente into American, West European and West
German versions.
The polycentric trends supposedly evolving in the
East were unambiguously operant in the West. The
structural dissimilarities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
placed Washington at a pronounced disadvantage vis-a-vis
Moscow as regards directing a common foreign policy. While
coercion was, and is, Moscow's instrument of control,
Washington must primarily rely upon persuasion and common
interests. The change of threat perception that ushered
in the detente era further eroded US predominance by
calling into question the strongest common interest of all:
fear of the USSR. These factors encouraged the natural
tendency to pursue more individual and nationalistic foreign
policies, which were given yet an added impetus by a certain
degree of US default on its leadership role. These systemic
problems were exacerbated by the lack of a coherent detente
scheme in the West that could have provided common guidelines
to direct the general flow of individual policy initiatives.
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In many respects detente functioned more as a mood
and justification than a concrete program of action.
The Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance had
declared that the relaxation of tensions with the East was
compatible with and even complementary to defence and
deterrence. But this combination, while entirely rational
as a policy, was ambiguous as to precisely how the Soviet
Union and the other Communist-governed countries of
Eastern Europe were to be approached for limited cooperation
and a security partnership. [Ref. 86: p. 37]
Washington's early withdrawal from an active role in
European detente after the signing of the Quadripartite
Agreement ensured the policy division against which
Kissinger had warned in 1969. At that time the US answer
for constraining a possibly precipitous West German
Ostpolitik had been application of the linkage principle:
no Eastern treaties, with their recognition of the
territorial status quo
,
unless Moscow first cooperated on
Berlin. Between then and 1979, however, too much had
happened and the divergence in threat perceptions had
become too pronounced for the US to be able to command a
return to a more traditional Soviet policy.
A logical outcome of aligning itself with declared
NATO detente policy was the creation of a greater degree of
maneuverability for the FRG within the Western Alliance.
In shedding the burden of complete dependence on NATO,
Bonn declared itself no longer ready to unconditionally
accept Western dominance of its political and economic
future. [Ref. 3: p. 722] The ensuing and ever-growing
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intra-NATO disagreements on alliance policy vis-a-vis the
East can be traced to that moment of incipient assumption
by Bonn of greater responsibility for its own fate. Joffe
has correctly asserted that "by quarantining its 'special
conflict' with the East, the Federal Republic acquired a
new set of interests as well as vulnerabilities which
together, almost add up to a 'special detente' with the
countries of the Warsaw Pact." [Ref. 87: p. 90] Greater
foreign policy independence incurred the risk, and even the
likelihood, however, of eventual disputes with alliance
partners
.
Disillusioned with Soviet detente for its own
reasons and determined to "punish" Moscow for the invasion of
Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland,
Washington called for Western sanctions against the USSR in
December 1979 and December 1981. The West German decisions
to defy the US and continue with "business as usual" shocked
Washington and shattered West Germany's image as the "model
ally". Differences on economic issues, especially when
related directly to detente policy, have accounted for
steadily worsening Bonn-Wa'shington relations. West Germany's
heavy political and emotional investment in detente has
added to the questioning of US leadership with regard to
NATO economic policy. As noted by Yost, "West European
governments spurn United States suggestions to diminish
certain links with the East because they regard detente and
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improved East -West trade as long-term security measures
complementary to the United States security guarantee
embodied in NATO." [Ref. 88: p. 435] Thus the search for
"supplemental security" merged with the drive to protect
detente progress (or at least prevent detente impediment).
Foreign policy action based on the theoretical
assumption of sufficient political maturity to pursue
national goals via Ostpolit ik was facilitated, and even
encouraged, by the lack of strong US leadership in Europe
during the decade of the 1970s. From Bonn's perspective,
Washington had no real grounds to fault West German policy
since, as Brandt pointedly remarked, "the FRG has begun to
define its own interests, to analyze its possibilities and
its role and to transform the results into practical
policies. Precisely this has repeatedly been pressed upon
us in past years by the US. There is no reason to complain
about this when it acutally now occurs." [Ref. 43: p. 183]
Although those words of policy justification were spoken
in 1967, the message conveyed was even more pertinent in
1980: Do not condemn us for becoming what you yourself
urged upon us. And, he might have added, all for the
sake of a Soviet policy not originally of our own choosing.
It was the obvious discrepancy in role definition that
precipitated much of the US-West German discord.
Bonn, in fact, was the object of more than its fair
share of US anger in that "The split that opened within the
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Western Alliance was between Europe and America, not West
Germany and the rest. Yet in the resulting row within NATO
it was West Germany's motives that were most closely
questioned." [Ref. 89: p. 131] If, as earlier contended, the
theoretical long-term aims of Ostpolit ik seem scarcely nearer
realization now than in 1969, the perceptible, short-term
changes associated with the issue of an evolving West German
role definition have been succinctly summarized by Nerlich:
Moscow came to regard and accept the FRG as the leading
Western European power. Moreover, the FRG is also now
immune to French pressure on the German question. . . .
At the same time, France, which saw itself robbed of its
own options by Bonn's Ostpolitik, and other Western allies,
which saw this policy rather as disburdening for the
Westpolitik, developed a new image of the FRG with looser
ties to the West
.
Thus, Ostpolitik has consequences above all for the
Western alliance and was in this sense short-term, that is,
it was valid up to the point where a modus vivendi was
•established. ... it did not provide German-American
relations with any lasting priority in the policy of the
FRG. Washington certainly did not adhere to such a
priority. . . . while the Ostpolitik did open up a new
margin of maneuver in German-American relations, it did
not establish any lasting role distribution either in the
German or in the American foreign policy. [Ref. 90:
pp. 376-377]
One aspect of that search to find a new role manifested
itself in conflicting US-West German versions of detente
management. In the pursuit of commonly-held goals, such
as encouraging greater regard for human rights, differences
of preferred policy method stood in stark contrast to one
another.
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With Ostpolit ik dependent in large measure on Soviet
willingness to continue the process, the rapid deterioration
of superpower relations threatened an early end to Soviet-West
German detente. More sensitive to the internal implications
for the Kremlin of expanded human rights in the USSR and
Eastern Europe and appreciating that the FRG as an important
economic partner could conceivably derive a political advantage
from that status, Bonn sensibly opted for a low-key approach
to that issue.
For Moscow to admit that ethnic groups feel foreign in the
USSR-when they had been a part of the czarist empire-
amounts to admitting the total failure of the Soviet
nationalities policy, . . . and thus implicitly
acknowledging that any ethnic group which does not identify
with the USSR has the right to leave. This is what the
German demands [to emigrate to the FRG] mean for the
Soviet regime. . . .
In line with this, Chancellor Schmidt, anxious to give as
many Germans as possible a chance to emigrate, realized
that discreet negotiations bore more fruit than noisily
framed demands. He therefore remained silent after
President Carter's vehement statements on human rights
and the right of emigration, and maintained this attitude
at the Belgrade Conference. [Ref. 91: p. 202]
Soviet pressure on the FRG to assist in moderating extreme
and "peace-threatening" US attitudes placed Bonn in an
uncomfortable position between East and West. Efforts to
protect its own interests, as well as those of the West in
general, by preserving its detente link with Moscow
contributed to the expanding West German role being fashioned.
The West European trend toward generally more
independent nationalistic policies was viewed by the US as
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particularly dangerous to Alliance unity in the West German
case. The fear of increasing accommodation to Moscow for
the sake of Ostpolitik appeared realized in Bonn's audacious
assumption of a mediator role in the superpower dialogue
and the demonstrated unwillingness to interrupt detente
upon command. With the earlier assumption that geographic
vulnerability and reliance on NATO for security purposes
would ensure West German agreement with US proposals no
longer valid, some in Washington jumped to the conclusion
that the FRG was placing too high a priority on good
relations with Moscow.
The potential implicit within its detente relation-
ship vis-a-vis Bonn for instigating discord in NATO and
isolating the FRG had not escaped the Kremlin. Obviously
manipulative ploys to that end have not been lacking, as
witnessed by "earlier American suspicions of the Federal
Republic [that] had been aroused by Brezhnev's turning to
Schmidt, after his disillusionment with Carter, as his
principal detente partner-at a time when West Germany had
been disillusioned about Ostpolit ik by East Germany's
refusal to intensify it and was thus looking for help from
Moscow to reactiviate it." [Ref. 92: p. 128] As further
reinforcement to defend one's perceived national interests
in the face of US pressure to do otherwise, well-timed
incentives were provided by the East. "Political developments
in West Germany pointing toward a loosening of that country's
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solid ties to the West and an increasing distancing from
America as the leading Western power, have prompted the
East Germans to adopt a more flexible stance." [Ref. 93: p. 6]
Although the conditions to produce another Rapallo are not
present , many in the West fear an erosion of West German
loyalty to NATO leading to a gradual "self-Finlandizat ion"
for the sake of Ostpolit ik . The FRG ' s physical vulnerability
and the conviction of most West Germans that almost any
war -even non-nuclear -would result in the country's
destruction add further credibility to that scenario.
To allay these nagging allied doubts, the current
CDU/CSU government has striven to reject the image created
by SPD governments of a West German intermediary between
the US and USSR. ("The citizens of our country are keenly
aware of the fact that we would be cast in the wrong role as
mediators between or arbitrators for the superpowers. . . .
We didn't-like the SPD-fail to keep our word to our alliance
partners. We withstood the threats from the Soviet Union.
We didn't yield to pressures from the streets." [Ref. 94:
p. 1]). Assurances of continued loyalty to the West have
likewise been offered. ("The Federal Republic of Germany
is firmly integrated into the European Community and the
Western alliance of free and democratic countries. This
integration is based on a deep conviction and not on
opportunist considerations. Our political priority has
been and remains: freedom before unity." [Ref. 95: p. 6]).
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The explicit admisstion that previous SPD governments
harbored too grand a design for the FRG has nonetheless
failed to eradicate the lingering suspicion that national




. Implications for the German Question
A fundamental reason for conflicting US-West German
preferences on Soviet policy lay in subtly but profoundly
differing notions of detente goals. The obvious West German
participation in the establishment of a "divisible detente"
left the FRG open to accusations of disloyalty, revived
nationalism or, at a minimum, dangerously drifting eastward.
Concern about national interests per se was not the reason
Washington singled out Bonn's policies for especially severe
censure. Rather, suspicions that revisionist aims lurking
behind a declaratory policy of Alliance unity served as the
primary impetus for Ostpolit ik haunted many Western politicians
Although German reunification had been downplayed by SPD
theorists by presenting it as a natural byproduct of European
unity, fears of an actual attempt to resolve a national
grievance were not easily assuaged.
Western reaction to Bonn's disappointment with the
cancellation of the scheduled Honecker visit demonstrated
how unpopular the reunification theme is within NATO.
Unease at the brief warming trend in intra-German relations
manifested itself in relieved references to commitment to the
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status quo . The Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti,
unleased a storm of protest from Bonn with his blunt
assessment of the FRG's political future, while simultaneously-
eliciting supporting statements from other West European
capitals
:
in Britain: "The Russians want to be assured of one thing,
and we are just as determined as they to keep Germany
divided"; in France: "It is fortunate for us that
Richelieu, or at least his spirit, rules in the Kremlin"
and "I love Germany so much, it makes me happy to have
two of them"; in Italy [Andreotti]: "There are two German
states and it should stay that way"; in Austria: "The
Italian Foreign Minister simply formulated more clearly
what everyone thinks." [Ref. 96: pp. 18, 20]
Italian equation of Ostpolit ik with "pan-Germanism" actually
differed little in substance from long-standing Soviet
accusations of "revanchism" . Inability to persuade the West
and convince the East of its true acceptance of the status
quo indicates a fundamental failure to communicate adequately
the Brandt/Bahr concepts. (Or, conversely, it may indicate
that the underlying reunification thrust has in fact been
communicated and understood very well.)
The Andreotti episode, painful for Bonn, cause for
official glee in East Berlin, suggested that Mr. Kohl,
a talkative politician who is not always careful with
his words, has an international public relations problem
in selling his Deutschlandpolit ik . Although his NATO
allies generally applaud the wooing of East Germany and
the forging of economic ties that make it increasingly
dependent on Bonn, few statesmen in Western Europe would
favor upsetting the postwar system built around two
German states. [Ref. 97: p. 5]
Short of granting de jure recognition to the GDR , it
is problematic whether any West German government could
convincingly allay Eastern and Western fears of reunification
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hopes. Yet even in the event of that recognition, many
would most likely persist in ascribing to Bonn concealed
dreams of restored German unity being achieved as the
result of a finally secure SED opting for some form of
political union. The Eastern treaties and Helsinki Accords
did, after all, carefully preserve that very possibility of
peacefully altering existing borders. Regardless of the
actual or fancied existence of revisionist goals, it would
be alarmist to anticipate at this point an FRG turning
either bellicose or neutralist for the sake of a
reunification issue that "was subtly transformed. The
issue is no longer a matter of territorial but of
political change; not the nature of the border but the
nature of the relationship between the two German states
is at stake." [Ref. 23: p. 230]
Bonn has repeatedly stressed that the main thrust of
its East German policy is to ameliorate the effects of
Germany's division, with reunification a subsidiary and
distant goal. Heinrich Windelen, the Federal Minister for
Intra-German Relations, has been quoted as stating in
regard to the GDR:
We are committed, in the existing circumstances, to at
least making the consequences of the division of Germany
more tolerable for the people concerned by exploiting the
opportunities afforded by a policy aimed at a modus
Vivendi. We are not bent on destabilizing the GDR. We
want rather to bring about practical solutions, and to
this end the GDR needs latitude for negotiation, as we
ourselves do. Consequently, we face up to reality.
[Ref. 98: p. 4]
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That last sentence may well have been intended to convey the
old assurances that the FRG is neither distancing itself
from NATO nor attempting to isolate the USSR within the
Warsaw Pact. ("East Berlin's credits, trade and political
contacts with Bonn are destabilizing the GDR. . . . East
Berlin's attempt to gain autonomy, according to Koptelzev
[Soviet emissary to the Soviet embassey in East Berlin],
is being financially supported by the Federal government and
contributes to isolation of the USSR within its own camp."
[Ref. 99: p. 20]) Given both Western and Eastern refusal to
countenance reunification and the sense of impending bloc
destabilizat ion inherent within improved intra-German
political relations, Bonn's ability to pursue both short
or long-term Ostpolit ik aims is indeed severely constrained.
Yet the domestic demand to maintain the policy has remained
strong, though much of the demand has been based on
considerations other than reunification.
Unlike the US, which can periodically declare detente
dead, the FRG cannot afford the luxury of "unpredictability"
in its relations with the USSR. Pragmatism, not reunification
dictates that Ostpolit ik remain on track. It is a sober
awareness of preponderant Soviet military strength located
on its border that demands maintenance of the Eastern
connection. The need for predictability
reflects an awareness on the part of German leadership
that Western policies toward the Soviet Union cannot
produce a major change in the Eastern political system.
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. . . The pursuit o.f predictability in Germany's East-West
relations reflect [ sic ] less a policy of appeasement toward
the Soviet Union than a pragmatic account taken of the
realities of Soviet power, as well as of the vulnerabilities
of West Europe in general and West Germany in particular.
That these realities are more inescapable for Europeans
than they are for Americans is a fact of geography and power;
Europe and Germany need detente with the adjacent Soviet
superpower more than does the more remote and powerful
United States. [Ref. 100: p. 108]
Although determining either the point at which concern
passes through deference to become anticipatory accommodation
or the degree of self-interest prompting trade with the East
is not the task at hand, these issues nonetheless provide
recurrent points of criticism leveled at Bonn. Yet, as
Christoph Bertram adds, "on the other hand, . . . the
Federal Republic has become both too aware of its political
and economic weight and too firmly rooted in the Western
alliance to accept a status of subservience to Soviet demands."
[Ref. 100: p. 108] Thus in spite of those charges, as well
as that of pursuing its "private concern" vis-a-vis the GDR,
Ostpolit ik represents the only politically viable option
available to Bonn. In this rather precarious situation,
"the critical variables, now as throughout Germany's last
decades, seem to be the nature and strength of Germany's
American connection." [Ref. 101: p. 269]
US commitment to the status quo conflicts with that
of the FRG. Both the FRG and the USSR accepted the present
political solution in order to modify it in the long-term,
with asymmetrical objectives. Washington, however, prefers
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perpetuation of the existing structure, fearing the possible
consequences of any tampering with a system that has
satisfied its own political needs. The issue at stake is the
debate between two forms of dynamism and the American
preference for stability. "As the endless surges and
recessions of power throughout history indicate, a fixed
status quo is an absurdity because static." [Ref. 102: p. 358]
By advocating maintenance of a restrictive structure that
offers little scope for national growth or progress, the US
risks slowly losing influence in the FRG in particular, and
Western Europe in general. By striving to moderate the
dynamic forces operant within all societies that tends
toward the expression of national purposes, the US could
conceivably place Bonn in the position of having to choose
between domestic requirements for Ostpolitik and its own
foreign policy preferences.
Since the Reagan-Kohl efforts to repair damaged US-
West German relations, the US has returned to an anti-Soviet
evaluation of the European, and hence also German, division.
Mertes quotes two representative examples:
Secretary of State George Shultz: "Let me be very clear:
The United States does not recognize the legitimacy of
the artificially imposed division of Europe. This'
division is the essence of Europe's security and human
rights problem, and we all know it." On the same subject.
President Reagan stated on February 5, 1985: "There is
one boundary which Yalta symbolizes that can never be
made legitimate, and that is the dividing line between
freedom and repression. I do not hesitate to say that
we wish to undo this boundary. . . . protecting the
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security of one nation by robbing another of its national
independence and national traditions is not legitimate.
In the long run, it is not even secure." [Ref. 95: pp. 4-5]
US public endorsement of the traditional formula concerning
the source of political instability in Europe is welcome in
Bonn in that it creates the impression of US dedication to
European unity and restored policy consensus within the
Alliance. Realization, however, that similar rhetoric has
previously served to mask status quo sentiments gives Bonn
little reason to derive comfort from such statements.
In the final analysis, the FRG remains existent ially
dependent on the US nuclear guarantee for provision of its
basic security requirements. Retention of that security
source severely circumscribes the measure of political
independence gained vis-a-vis both alliance blocs from
Qstpolitik . Yet if the US
should demand that West Germany, in the interest of the
alliance, sacrifice her ostpolitik (for example, because
of Soviet policy in Poland), that she stop treating the
Kremlin in a special way because it controls East Germany
and the access to West Berlin, then nobody can foresee
with certainty what this would mean for German domestic
affairs. [Ref. 103: p. 183]
Berlin is the crucial focal point of West German foreign
policy in that it "marks the limits of independence. It is
here that the Soviets can apply pressure which only the
Western alliance can effectively counter." [Ref. 104: p. 879]
But contrary to Kennedy's assertion, Berlin is not
necessarily safe.
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VI. EUROPE'S FUTURES; AMERICAN TUTELEGE
,
WEST GERMAN ASCENDENCY, SOVIET HEGEMONY?
Detente has failed to resolve satisfactorily the German
question due to the mutually exclusive goals pursued by (and
differing interests involved for) the US, the USSR and the
FRG. Although the policies of all three countries have been
based on a certain acceptance of the present territorial
status quo
,
each has perceived its significance as a
politico-security structure differently. As a result of
conflicting purposes, disparate means available by which to
achieve them, and the contrasting ways in which the policies
have been pursued, the detente period has set in motion
trends that are of crucial importance for future developments
in Europe, and especially Germany. The consequences of altered
West German perceptions of the superpowers and of the Federal
Republic's own role are, and will be, major factors in shaping
the West German political environment. What the FRG conceives
its role to be and how it evaluates US and Soviet intentions
toward Germany itself are critical issues for European
affairs
.
A primary consequence of the detente period has been the
large degree of success achieved by the Soviet "peace"
campaign. Although aimed at all West European countries,
the FRG, as noted earlier, was more susceptible to this
propaganda program and objectively more important, and
126
consequently received a greater level of Soviet attention.
Since many West Germans readily embraced "the academic
prejudice to the effect that detente secures the peace while
deterrence endangers it," [Ref. 105: p. 220] a mere fostering
of widely held doubts about aggressive Soviet intentions
would probably decrease public willingness to divert economic
resources from social programs to defense requirements. By
aligning itself with indigenous protest forces and playing
upon West German fear of war, the Kremlin could present
itself as a European ally equally concerned about the
possible consequences of US unpredictability and dangerous
"arms-racing"
.
This low-risk policy is a conservative and subtle Soviet
method for resolving a thorny problem. Fomenting too rapid
a dest abilizat ion could cause a nationalistic backlash in
the FRG that would not be at all in Soviet interests.
Considering its fearful respect for German ability and
potential, the USSR may well prefer a gradual replacement
of US influence on the continent with its own. In other
words, a weak and generally ineffective US presence may be
preferred to a united Western Europe that would almost
certainly be led by the FRG, owing to its economic importance.
In claiming the need for arms control and the irreversibility
of peaceful coexistence, while simultaneously amassing over-
whelming conventional, chemical, and nuclear forces on the
inter-German border, Moscow has created unprecedented
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uncertainty about ultimate goals where previously a clear
sense of danger had been perceived. Detente served as the
ideal vehicle for this dual track policy.
Without detente, Soviet superiority or military pressure
can encourage Atlantic unity or, if West Europeans perceive
the Atlantic connection as unreliable or dangerous, drive
the West European countries toward unity and an autonomous
defense. Without Soviet superiority, detente can promote
instability in Eastern Europe by raising East European
expectations excessively and by increasing West European
influence in that area. It is only the two together which
maximize Soviet interests. That Moscow understands this
point is demonstrated plainly by its campaign for "military
detente." [Ref. 106: p. 47]
The fact that an enemy's hostile intent has become questioned
at all indicates that the underlying premise of antagonism is
no longer assumed.
By shifting the arena of East-West competition from
explicit military confrontation to implicit psychological
warfare, Soviet detente efforts in Europe have made great
strides in the struggle for men's minds. In the absence of
an alternative Western model for European development , that
proffered by the USSR could conceivably be embraced through
either default or gullibility. Although polarized political
elements exist in all Western countries, the increasingly
general West German sentiment favoring "peace at any price,"
the classic Soviet' formulation of international relations
under modern conditions, cannot be taken lightly. According
to Schwarz, an eminent West German authority, "the detente
of the 1970s is primarily defensive, interested in maintaining
the status quo and already, within individual European
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leftist parties, influenced by efforts to align with the
new lord and master in consequence of the decline of
American power." [Ref. 57: p. 294]
The formulation may not be so crudely phrased or even
consciously admitted by the average West German, yet the
popular conviction that war must be avoided at all costs
equates to an attitude of accommodation, if not appeasement,
of the USSR. Taken to its logical conclusion, the traditional
assumption of a state's willingness to defend itself is no
longer necessarily valid in the case of the FRG. Convinced
that the stakes are too high to warrant the risk and having
been persuaded prior to the initiation of any armed conflict
that the results are irrevocably predetermined to their
disadvantage, the FRG and other Western European countries
could possibly adopt a self-deterrent posture, thus falling
prey to a Soviet propaganda coup of immense proportions. If
the principle that "war is the continuation of politics by
other means" remains operant in the USSR, and the Soviets
more and more successfully maneuver the West German populace
into a beli^ in the Clausewitzian dictum that "in war only
the defender is to blame", the implications for NATO are
sobering. "The attacker always prefers to make his conquest
peacefully. In practical terms it follows that a policy
characterizing peace as the highest value must either regard
armed forces as completely superfluous or have decided in
advance to surrender in the face of adversity." [Ref. 28: p. 199]
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Admittedly, the above describes an extreme situation and
one cannot disregard Stent's assertion that "there is a
limit to how far it [the USSR] can turn these Western
quarrels to its own advantage. Disagreements with the
United States do not automatically translate in most West
European capitals into closer ties with the Soviet Union."
[Ref. 34: p. 103] Nonetheless, it is difficult, given the
growth of antinuclear feelings, the degree of Alliance
discord and the Soviet assault on national volition, to
endorse that author's optimistic conclusion: "Opportunities
to divide and influence Western Europe will remain, but the
Soviet Union will come no nearer to controlling Western
Europe than it does now." [Ref. 34: p. 104] Lack of
self-determination can appear in many guises, as West
Germans well know.
The US has offered the FRG no alternative to a static,
defensive status quo with no possibility of change for the
future. Although the West Germans do not desire a Soviet
hegemonic security system, Soviet plans do reflect an
affinity to the element of restless dynamism within West
German society that the present structural system suppresses.
Change itself, if not necessarily any government's preferred
outcome, is inevitable, and part of the West German
dissatisfaction with the current static situation stems from
what is perceived as US mismanagement of Alliance affairs.
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If the West German image of the USSR has mellowed, that
of the US has lost its luster. As a result of the US
generally neglecting European detente and tactlessly
exacerbating US-West German detente differences during the
Carter (and to a lesser degree during the first Reagan)
Administration, the FRG has severely questioned US leadership
capability. Carter's human rights program, for example,
was seen by most West Germans as a counter-productive attempt
to somehow refashion Soviet society. This approach clashed
violently with Schmidt's policy of quiet diplomacy aimed at
securing tangible results. The difference of approach also
highlighted conflicting detente expectations: conversion
versus convergence. The extremes of US leadership styles
and political platforms, and the rapid transitions between
them, resulted in inconsistent policies and the general
perception of unpredictability in Western Europe. The West
European response to the vagaries of the American political
system has been a modest but growing impetus toward unity,
with West German sponsorship. As a consequence of its
detente performance, the US must now face the possibility
of its long-espoused vision of a more self-reliant Western
Europe actually becoming reality.
As has been evident in the reaction to President
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, Western Europe
appears more determined than in the past to develop a
common continental front within the Alliance. The US has
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verbally supported West European political integration
throughout the postwar period. Concepts of equality and
partnership have characterized the US view of the desired
relationship with its NATO allies. Yet the US perception
of an economically recovered Europe as unwelcome competition
sparked a reaction marked by nationalistic self-interest.
Behind all the talk of equality the unspoken assumption of
superiority has remained intact. Should the US transfer
that attitude and type of behavior to the political realm,
the effect upon Alliance unity could prove disasterous.
If Western Europe were to act upon US importuning to
attain a greater "maturity" in its transatlantic relationship
by bearing a correspondingly greater share of the burden of
responsibility for Alliance affairs, Western Europe would
challenge the sincerity of American declaratory .policy . The
ERG has already been in the position of acceding to US
policy preferences (by initiating Ostpolit ik ) only to later
discover that Washington intended to retain final approving
authority for policy implementation. To avoid a recurrence
of that experience, the US must itself decide whether to
accept graciously a certain diminishing of its own influence
within the Alliance or continue with the damaging precedent
of proclaiming partnership while practicing paternalism.
Although the West European, and especially West German,
dependence on the US nuclear guarantee remains, the present
political and economic relationships within the Alliance no
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longer reflect the conditions of the 1950s. US leadership
is still necessary, but greater diplomatic skills and a
higher tolerance for allied pursuit of regional policies
are also required. The tutelege model has become
obsolescent and threatens to inhibit the development of
a more mutually beneficial relationship.
The US must take into account the consequences of its
success, i.e. of having prompted greater European political
integration and self-confidence, and react to it favorably or
risk facing the temptation to try to sabotage the very
process it itself instigated in order to remain predominant.
If Washington were to succumb to the latter option, it would
actually effect a merger of US and Soviet policies as regards
strategic goals and tactics employed: the prevention of
West European unity through the exploitation of "internal
contradictions". Only the USSR would gain from a situation
of US alienation from its European allies. In its search
for a balance between protecting European political stability
(territorial status quo considerations) and fashioning a
more flexible intra-Alliance relationship (dynamic factors),
the US must allow the FRG latitude in Ostpolit ik options.
The German question remains unsettled from Bonn's
perspective and cannot be separated from the larger question
of a future European settlement. US-Soviet detente served
to remove those issues as an official item on the superpower
political agenda, yet the countries most aggrieved by the
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status quo , the FRG and Eastern Europe, consider the matter
still open. [Ref. 18: p. 3] Until a political structure is
formed that lends a sense of national identity and provides
scope for creative action, Central Europe must remain a
collection of disaffected states searching for adequate
international self-expression.
The centuries-old problem of German identity reappears
as an unresolved issue of key importance. Buzan's
"part-nation-state" model pointedly summarizes the nature of
the continuing crisis:
The mystique of the unified nation-state frequently
exercises a strong hold on part-nation-states, and can
easily become an obsessive and overriding security issue.
Rival part-nation-states like East and West Germany . . .
almost automatically undermine each other's legitimacy,
and the imperative for reunification is widely assumed to
be an immutable factor that will re-emerge whenever
opportunity beckons. . . . Part-nation-states, then, can
represent a severe source of insecurity both to themselves
and to others. Their case offers the maximum level of
contradiction in the idea of national security as applied
to states, for it is precisely the nation that makes the
idea of the state insecure . (Emphasis added) [Ref. 107:
pp. 47-48]
Eastern and Western assumpt ions of an innate drive to
reunification predispose both blocs to discredit Bonn's
denials of revisionism. West German hopes for an eventual
convergence of the two German states depend upon the strength
of the appeal to nationhood. Ironically, the FRG ' s very
existence and the bond of historical-cultural tradition
prevent Bonn credibly assuring the SED regime of its position
in power, a crucial criterion of the Brandt/Bahr program for
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progressing toward convergence. Taken to its logical
conclusion, only de jure recognition of the GDR could
theoretically satisfy the SED security requirement necessary
for the blossoming of "fruitful coexistence". Assuring the
SED of its uncontested continued tenure in power would not
,
however, necessarily release that regime from its Existenzangst
Bonn would be deluding itself if it thought it could
achieve a meaningful and closer relationship with East Berlin
by surrendering its only real political bargaining chip. An
influx of Western visitors and ideas would be no less
threatening to SED legitimacy after de jure recognition than
before. Also, with the avidly desired prize in hand, the SED
would perceive no need to cooperate with Bonn except as
required by its own financial difficulties. By having played
its final card, all iriitiative would have been lost by the
FRG. Only through political use of the economic instrument
could Bonn even attempt to influence the further development
of Ostpolitik .
Additionally, although recognition by the West German
bete noire could prove ideologically uncomfortable
domestically, the SED has shown itself creatively resourceful
in maligning the FRG ' s policies no matter what the financial
gain they provided. All Communist regimes quite simply need
enemies to justify their own existence, and the SED
especially needs the FRG in that role. De jure recognition
would not affect the requirement for that survival mechanism.
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At the same time, however, the status of "foreign country"
could also be comforting to the SED , which could then tell
its people that their fate is sealed. This could
immeasurably assist the SED in managing its potentially
destabilizing problem of internal legitimacy. In view of all
these factors it is difficult to conceive of improved
intra-German relations on the basis of the Brandt/Bahr
concepts
.
Yet another argument for keeping the German question
open is Tucker's contention that the long-term prospects
for success of the communist part of the divided nation
decrease to the extent that the non-communist unit is
non-repressive. [Ref. 108: p. 244] Viewed from this
perspective, the FRG could most effectively achieve its
Qstpolit ik goals by merely offering a more attractive
alternative to the SED state. A major difficulty for Bonn,
however, will be negotiating a course between superpower
constraints.
Although this would be an unintended consequence, the
FRG may find itself forced into a Schaukelpolit ik between
Washington and Moscow.
Diplomatically, the Federal Republic might be caught in a
position which it has compulsively shunned from the day
of its inception in 1949-courted in the East and in the
West and suspected by both. Bonn would be confronted
with an impossible task: how to protect its "special
detente" with the East against the global freeze, while
safeguarding its older and far more vital ties to the
West. [Ref. 81: p. 209]
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Bonn faces the unenviable task of balancing interests in
several dimensions: domestic versus foreign, East versus
West, and European versus American. Many of the FRG '
s
options will depend upon how the US and the USSR manage
their West German policies. Moscow could destroy, for
instance, its own carefully groomed "peace" image, prompting
Bonn to strengthen its NATO ties. Washington, on the other
hand, could prove obstructionist regarding Ostpolit ik
and drive the FRG into greater accommodation with the USSR.
Should neither superpower adopt an extreme postion and the
present West European integrative trend continue, Bonn
would find itself in a position of leadership, a role for
which it is not yet prepared.
Even though it has not actively sought regional
predominance, the FRG's economic and military (in.conven-
tional terms) strength has guaranteed its political
ascendency. The Brandt/Bahr claim to a special West German
mission within Western detente toward overcoming the
continental division could find its incipient fulfillment in
West European unity. In line with that, Hahn warns of
"a German propensity to overestimate their own ability to
shape, manage and exploit their political environment on
the Continent." [Ref. 53: p. 880] West German leadership
on the continent would test that maturity of which Brandt
spoke. Allowing the FRG to assume that responsibility
would test that same quality among NATO members. In the
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interest of Alliance preservation one would do well to
remember Joffe's warning: Germany only looks to the East
when humiliated or deserted by the West. [Ref. 3: p. 721]
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